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Editorial note 
This Working Paper forms part of a series of five volumes 
dealing with the "Europeanisation" of product safety law. They 
are the result of a study carried out on behalf of the Commission 
of the EC which has so far been published only in German*. Tue 
publication of this English version has been made possible by a 
grant from Directorate General XI. 
Tue five volumes of this series of Working Papers should 
thus be read in context. Volume 1 (Chapter 1) aims to show why 
product safety law has given rise to extremely diverse regulation 
pattems and to provide an overview of the most important 
instruments for action. 
Volumes 2 and 3 (Chapter II) are concemed with recent 
developments in the relevant legislation of the economically most 
important Community Member States and of the United States. 
Volume 2 (Chapter II, Parts 1 and 2) contains reports on France 
and the United Kingdom, Volume 3 (Chapter II parts 3 and 4) 
deals with the Federal Republic of Germany and the US 
Consumer Product Safety Act 1972, which is of crucial 
importance in the international debate. 
Volume 4 (Chapters III and IV) analyses the development of 
the "traditional" policy of approximation of law and of efforts at a 
"horizontal" European product safety policy. In both policy areas 
it proved impossible to realise the Community's programmatic 
* Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-W. Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von 
Kosnumgütern und die Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 1988. 
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goals. As far as policy on achieving the intemal market is 
concemed, the Commission itself has pointed out the reasons and 
called for, and implemented, a fundamental revision of traditional 
legal approximation policy. This reorientation of Community 
policy is dealt with in Chapters IV; it describes the most 
important precursors of the new intemal market policy, namely 
ECJ case law on Articles 30 and 36 EEC since the Cassis de 
Dijon judgment, and regulatory technique for the Low Voltage 
Directive and then analyses the new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards, whereby the Community will 
restrict itself in its directives to setting "essential safety 
requirements'', leaving it to European and national 
standardisation bodies to convert these safety requirements into 
technical specifications. 
Volume 5 (Chapters V and VI) evaluates the effects of the 
Community's new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards on product safety policy. Chapter V diagnoses a new 
need for action in the area of product safety policy, including in 
particular the internal organisation of the standardisation process, 
and participation by consumer associations in European 
standardisation. Chapter VI continues a comprehensive 
discussion of alternatives open for co-ordinating intemal market 
and product safety policy. lt argues that a policy of 
"deregulating" Member States' product safety legislation would 
not be feasible, and opts for a "positive" supplementation of the 
new approach by a horizontal Community product safety policy. 
This option is elaborated in a number of recommendations. 
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Chapter II: 
Examples of product safety legislation 
lt is no coincidence that up-to-date comparative accounts of 
Member States product safety laws are largely unavailable. This 
is no coincidence. Technical safety law, to the extent that it deals 
with technical consumer goods, has been largely ignored by 
academic legal science, and is therefore given less importance in 
comparative law. Moreover, product safety law is much more 
strongly bound up with technical and organisational 
administrative structures than, for example general civil law. 
These structures must be recognised in order to understand its 
regulatory functions, but are hard for the foreign observer to gain 
access to. Tue description below will therefore have to proceed 
selectively, and will be confined to the laws of France, Britain 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. Restriction to these States 
is problematic because it means overlooking innovative 
developments in smaller Member States and the current situation 
in new ones. But the choice of France, Britain and the FRG is in 
line with the economic importance of these States and their 
general influence in the Community. U.S. law is also taken into 
account, since important stimuli to the further development of 
product safety law have come from the American Consumer 
Product Safety Act. 
Part 1: 
Product safety law in France 
French product safety law is hard to fit into a market-ori-
ented approachl. Tue French analytical framework, conceived 
from a State or administration viewpoint, of preven-
tion/repression/reparation, cuts straight across a German market-
oriented category frame of market-related rules, setting of stan-
dards and follow-up market controls2. Given the emerging Euro-
peanisation of safety policy, it is important to grasp what conver-
gence exists and seek to bring it into a European, self-contained 
product safety policy. 
1.1 French perspectives on product safety law 
An approach to the field can be established from a 
schematic overview of French safety and standards policy. A 
historical outline of the development of both policies will be at-
tempted. An evaluation of the process might seem to be a bold 
venture, but the Europeanisation of product safety has to start 
from a definition of the state of Member States' product safety 
policy. A more technical matter is the explanation of the French 
categorical framework of prevention/repression/ reparation, but 
this is a necessary prerequisite for an understanding of the 
specifically French way of perceiving and managing product 
safety policy. 
Since France can be regarded as a market economy in the German 
sense only conditionally; see Behrens/Korb-Schikaneder, 1984. 
2 This classical approach can be found in precisely the same way in the 
consumer policy debate; see Calais-Auloy, 1985, 77 et seq. 
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Product Safety Policy 
Periods 
Starting position 
Transition to social state 
Building up of a product 
safety policy 
1985 proposals by Commission 
de ia Refonte 1985 
Prevention 
Empowennent to issue orders 
regulating conditions of trade 
Art. 11 of the 1905 Act "fraudes et 
falsification") 
Regulation of specific areas of product 
safety by 1978 Act 
Prcvcntivc regulation by ordinancc (no 
gcneral clause) 
Setting up of a Consumer safcty 
Commission in 1983, general clause 
instead of individual regulation 
Setting up of nonnal and emergcncy 
procedures for dealing with hazards 
Setting up of intervention instruments 
(recalls, etc.) 
Setting up of database on unsafc 
producL' and home and leisure 
accidents 
Commission de la Refonte did 
preliminary work for the 1983 Act 
Adopted with slight departures 
Repression 
Penal sanctions against deceitful 
actions in case of intentional 
infringement 
(Art. 1 of 1905 Act) 
No penal sanctions for manufacture 
or sale of unsafc products 
Amendmcnt to Art. 1 of 1905 
(inclusion of product safcty) 
Casc law makes possiblc criminal 
sentencc in casc of negligence 
Still no separate pcnal sanction for 
marketing an unsafe product 
Extension of intervention powers 
under thc 1905 Act to control, by the 
1983 Act 
New cmphasis in int.ervcntion 
powcrs 
Separate criminal offence of 
marketing unsafe products 
huop„:an Convcnuon on Producl\ Liabilily in rcgard to Pcrson~l Injury and Dcath (CE, Strasbourg, 1977) 
Rcparalions 
Liability in tort: liability for fault 
Contractual liability: guarantee liability 
in case of fraud 
(Code Civile Art. 1382/1641) 
Liability in tort: supply of a defective 
product sufficient to prove fault (1962) 
ContractUlil liability: Manufacturer's and 
seller's knowledge of ddectiveness of 
product assumed incontrovertibly 
(development of case law up to 1971) 
Interweaving of tortious and guarantce 
liability in the basic requirements 
Opening of product safety policy for 
judicial cnntrol through Art. 1 of the 
1983 Act 
Adoption of J}lOposals of the "Strasbourg 
Convention" 
Strict liability including developmcnt 
risks 
No restriction as to arnount 
Standardization Policy 
Periods 
Starting point 
1941 - 1943 
Transitional phase, /960s 
Restructuring of French 
standardization policy in 1984 
Further-reaching reform 
proposals by Minister of 
lndustry and the Economy in 1982 
Prevemion 
Safcty Standards a task for thc 
Govemment Administration 
Commissioner for standardization 
initiales and checks private (AFNOR) 
standard setting 
Safety standards rnay bc declared 
legally binding 
Strcngthening of AFNOR, with 
tendency to withdraw by Government 
1964: Commissioncr for 
standardization abandons comrol of 
content of standards 
AFNOR increasingly takes working 
out of standards on itself 
AFNOR introduces a new category of 
standards (registerd standards) 
Tendcncy to privmization, 
accompanied by opening up of 
procedure (democratization) 
Setting up of Suprcme Council on 
Standardization to coordinate policies 
Transfer of approval procedure to 
AFNOR 
Strengthening of consumer 
involvement on Supreme Council for 
Standardization and in AFNOR 
Advocacy-to-standards of adoption of 
reference technique (§ 3 GSG) 
Introduction of a spccial safety mark 
Repression 
State supervises compliance with 
standards declared binding 
Othcrwise, no penalties for 
misleading use of confomity mark 
"NF' (Norme Fran,aise) 
AFNOR assumes de.facto control 
ovcr observance of standards 
Individual interventions by 
Government (Commissioners for 
stanclardization) 
Possibility of declaration of 
bindingness 
which loses importance because of 
the ECJ (1983) 
Administration binds itself in 
compliance with standards, as in 
GSG 
Effect on repression not 
systcmatically discussed 
Reparation 
If standards declarr.d legally binding are 
infringed, compcnsation for damage 
even without fault 
Effect of AFNOR liability in the evcnt of 
faulty standardization not known 
Tendency to opcn up thc Court system 
for verification of technical standards 
Role of technical standards in liability 
not discussed 
1.1.l Schematic overview of French product safety and stan-
dards policy 
The diagrams below make no claiin to completeness, but do 
aim to outline the tendencies operating in both policy areas. This 
cannot be done without considerable simplification. The state of 
legal development at the turn of the century has been taken as a 
starting point. This is simply because relevant laws were enacted 
in France shortly thereafter. The thread of development is then 
picked up again for pragmatic reasons after the Second World 
War, with special consideration going to the wave of reforms in 
the 1970's, which then led to a phase of regression. Since there 
has not yet been a coherent product safety policy in France, at 
least not including technical standards, development in both pol-
icy areas must initially be described separately. This leads to a 
time shift, since standards policy as it were, leapt over the refonn 
phase of the 1970's, and did not take on iinportance in France un-
til economic crises, unemployment and the wave of deregulation 
began to determine day-to-day politics. For the conceptual 
framework, the classical French system of prevention/ repres-
sion/reparation3 has been adopted. A transfer of this conceptual 
approach into standards policy makes it possible to compare reg-
ulatory instruments in each policy area with each other and 
thereby show that there is no overlap. 
"Prevention" includes the following measures: information, 
standard setting, both private and govemmental, follow-up mar-
ket control (administratively ordered recall), prohibition orders 
and the work of the French Consumer Safety Commission. 
3 This distinction is based essentially on the work of the Commission de 
Ja Refonte (note 2 supra) and the description of product safety law by 
Pizzio, 1984, 13 et seq. and 19 et seq., which is so far the sole comprc-
hensi ve overall description of the Ja w. 
3 
"Repression" concems primarily penal sanctions, but also 
covers imposition of compensatory payments and accompanying 
measures of sanction (bans or recalls ordered by judges, confis-
cation, destruction, closures etc.). 
"Reparation" deals with the French version of product lia-
bility. 
Tue reasons for the French conceptual structure lie in the 
one-sided administrative perspective on product safety as a 
whole. Tue viewpoint has already undergone some changes 
through inclusion of reparation as an instrument of safety policy, 
first incisively practised by the Commission de la Refonte4• Tue 
liberalisation policy pursued for some ten years now in France 
ought to lead to a blurring of the categorial outlines, since the 
private economy, the consumer and the courts will gain ground in 
safety regulation. However, at present, the whole political, legal 
policy and legal theory debate on standardisation and product 
safety in France continues to follow traditional lines. 
1.1.2 Product safety and standardisation side by side 
Tue conceptual framework of French product safety policy 
has (from the consumer's viewpoint also and especially) led to a 
very narrow understanding of product safety, which has no room 
for a number of relevant cross-connections. Thus, there is no 
systematic incorporation of standardisation into product safety 
policy. This is even truer of certification, which is hardly dis-
cussed at all. Though product liability is included in safety pol-
icy, it is treated only as leading to individual compensation for 
damages, not as an instrument for controlling product safety. Fi-
4 See Calais-Auloy, 1985. 
4 
nally, there is no discussion of the relationship between product 
liability and technical standard setting. Tue research approach 
pursued here, of bringing product safety and technical standards 
into relation with each other, meets in France, partly with rejec-
tion and partly with misunderstanding. Jt is rejected because the 
administration continues to be seen as the best guarantor of prod-
uct safety; it is misunderstood because the connecting lines are 
not clearly seen, due to the absence of intermeshing between 
product safety and standards; indeed, perhaps they do not even 
exist. Tue last point is true, at any rate, for the sphere of product 
liability, which seems not to refer to technical standardisation at 
all. 
Tue French governrnent is responsible for the regulation of 
product safety5. Standards are set by order. Tue administration's 
responsibility for product safety has remained unshaken even af-
ter the reform attempts of the l 980's. Tue setting up of a Con-
sumer Safety Commission6 was fitted seamlessly into an admin-
istrative product safety policy, for all that was done was to shift 
tasks from the administration, without at all limiting ultimate 
administration responsibility and control. Looking closely from 
the French viewpoint, at the distribution of roles among the three 
powers, the cautious inclusion of the courts appears to be the 
most desicive change in the newly introduced product safety 
law7. Still existing legislative and executive mistrust of inclusion 
of the judiciary can be seen from the fact that though Art.I is 
conceived as a general clause, it is not directed explicitly at the 
courts. Accordingly, until the significance of Art. 1 has become 
clear, more importance should be attached to the courts' power, 
newly introduced in 1983, to issue a banning order or withdraw 
products from the market by emergency procedure on application 
5 For details see 1.4 infra. 
6 See 1.3 infra. 
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- and not just to the relevant secretary of state or consumer 
minister, or certain administration officials8. Tue 1978 law still 
saw product safety policy entirely from an administrative point of 
view, and was explicitly aimed at excluding the courts from pre-
vention9. 
French standardisation is a governmental tasklO. AFNOR 
has been incorporated into the governmental organisation of 
standardisation, with the duty of drawing up technical standards, 
which, however, must be supervised and checked by the Com-
missioner for Standardisation as representative of the State. 
AFNOR has discretion only insofar as it is allowed by the French 
administration. Tue essentially governmental and administrative 
organisation of standardisation also means that the reforms of the 
1980's changed nothing. 
Nevertheless, the reform of 1983 is bringing shifts that 
might in the long run, lead to a change in the division of respon-
sibilities between government and the economy. Tue keywords 
are privatisation and politicisation of standardisation. Privatisa-
tion has come in since the reform made the administration yield 
some of its tasks to the privately organised standards body 
AFNOR; politicisation because creation of the Supreme Council 
for standardisation makes the guidelines for standardisation pol-
icy into a topic of public debate. Tue parallel with the standardis-
ation agreement reached in 1975 between DIN and the Federal 
Government is self-evidentll. No intermeshing of the reform at-
tempts in product safety law and in standardisation, which were 
pushed forward in parallel, took place, at least openly. With some 
7 Pizzio, 1984. 
8 See point 1.4.l infra. 
9 Calais-Auloy, 1980, 113 et seq. 
10 See point 1.7 infra. 
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exageration, one might say that product safety was discussed 
without standardisation, and standardisation without product 
safety. Para. 3 of the GSG (reference to standards) constitutes, 
from the German viewpoint, the bridge between the two policy 
areas. C. Germon and P. Maranol2 proposed the "German solu-
tion" in their report to the French Ministry for Industry. No dis-
cussion of the advantages and drawbacks of the German ap-
proach took place. However, there were some hints at it. Tue re-
arrangement of French standardisation was aimed primarily at 
strengthening the French economy's competiveness; expansion of 
consumer protection and the setting up of a supreme council for 
standardisation were to enhance acceptance of French standards 
in public awareness. Though the German GSG and consumer 
trust in standards were taken by C. Germon and P. Marano as 
shining examples, the French plainly went their own way towards 
increasing national competiveness. Comparison of the refonn 
proposals with the law shows that the French govemment ulti-
mately shrank from copying the German method of reference. 
1.2 The "safety philosophy" of the 1983 law 
While Art. 1 of the French law on product safetyI3 does Iay 
down a general obligation on the manufacturer to bring only safe 
products to the market, reference to the "generally recognised 
rules of the art" (allgemein anerkannten Regeln der Technik) is 
lacking: 
11 Cf. Chapter II, 3.4.2. 
12 Germon/Marano, 1982. 
13 Loi no. 83-660 du 21 juillet 1983 relative a Ja securite des consomma-
teurs et modifiant diverses dispositions de Ja loi du !er aoüt 1905, 
German translation in PHr 1984, 71 et seq. 
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"Les produits et les services doivent, dans des condi-
tions normales d'utilisation ou dans d'autres conditions 
raisonnablement previsibles par le professionnel, 
presenter la securite a laquelle Oll peut legitimement 
s'attendre et ne pas porter atteinte a la sante des per-
sonnes". 
The constitutive elements of this general clause are (1) the 
"autres conditions previsibles par le professionnel" and (2) "la 
securite a laquelle on peut legitimement s'attendre". lt is some-
times disputed that these are indeed two constitutive elements, 
since the "safety one may legitimately expect" also covers admis-
sible use. This is not so14. Tue "other reasonably foreseeable con-
ditions" describe the safety requirements on product manufacture. 
The addressee is the manufacturer. The "safety one may legiti-
mately expect", on the other ha_nd, defines the consumer's justi-
fied expectations of safety. Though the two viewpoints can theo-
retically be separated, they are in practice very similar. For the 
actual safety level must include requirements covering both the 
manufacturer and the consumer's expectations. 
1.2 .1 The general clause in Art. 1 
The important innovation in the 1983 law was the general 
duty of safety imposed on the manufacturer. France was thus 
drawing the consequences of the almost complete failure of the 
1978 framework regulationsIS. 
14 Schmidt-Salzer, 1986, Art. 6, Nos. 13 et seq., 116 et seq., 138 et seq. 
15 Loi no. 78-23 du 10 janv.ier 1978 sur Ja protection et l'information des 
consommateurs de prodmts et de services. The decisive passage of Art 
1 g~s "dans des conditions normales d'utilisation". On the Act, se~ 
Cala1s-Auloy, 1980, 113 et seq. 
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Only two orders were issued between 1978 and 1983. Ac-
cordingly, administrative regulation of the classical type could be 
regarded as having failed. Tue cumbersome decision-making 
process within the administration must have given the stimulus 
for setting up a separate consumer safety commission, which 
would have some autonomy at least in the areas of information 
gathering, assessment and processing. In 1985 the Commission 
bad a budget of 2.4 million francs at its disposal, 500,000 francs 
of which were designated for research purposes. Tue secretariat 
consisted of four people, including a secretary. 
According to the general clause, the Commission can itself 
consider almost any question and is not dependent on special au-
thorisation by any order or provision. This was the specific 
weakpoint of the 1978 lawl6. Here there is no doubt that admin-
istrative cumbersomeness helped bring back the courts into the 
process of State standard setting. Yet even these changes do not 
alter the main thrust of product safety regulation. As before, the 
chief addressee is the administration, which alone can give the 
safety obligation legal bindingness, by specifying the general 
clause through the enactment of orders, or by a ministerial de-
cree I 7. 
Since the French legislator has rejected adoption of the 
method of reference to standards, the question remains open as to 
how safety standards can be made specific. 
Technical standards can be adduced as aids to interpretation, 
but their observance does not offer the French manufacturer any 
protection against action under Art. l18. In practice, the manu-
facturer's main fear must be of the activities of the Consumer 
16 Pizzio, 1984, 14-15. 
17 More details in 1.4 infra. 
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Safety Commission, which has explicitly stated that the safety re-
quirements of Art. 1 may well lie higher than those of the techni-
cal standards drawn up by AFNOR19. 
1.2 .2 Determination of safety levels 
The shift in French safety philosophy emerges clearly from 
the change in wording from the 1978 safety law's "conditions 
normales d'utilisation" to the 1983 "autres conditions 
raisonnablement previsibles par le professionnel (qui doivent 
presenter) la securite a la quelle on peut legitirnernent s'attendre". 
The 1983 safety law for the first time separated the distinct 
standpoints of consumer and manufacturer, and at the same time 
heightened the requirements on the manufacturer. The criterion is 
not proper use, but reasonably foreseeable use; this is what the 
manufacturer has to use as a guide in design and production. 
Not many problems are presented by the consumer's posi-
tion. The definition states clearly that it is not the individual 
viewpoint that should be decisive, but the position of the average 
consumer20. 
Far greater difficulties of interpretation are presented by the 
intensification of the safety obligations on manufacturers21. The 
elementary political significance of the change in safety policy 
becomes clear from the stormy parliamentary debate. Admittedly, 
18 Pizzio, 1984, 17, No. 13. 
19 Commission de la Securite des Consommateurs, ler Rapport au Presi-
d_ent de la Republique et au Parlement, 1985 (cited infra as Commis-
s1on, 1985), 15; Commission de la Securite des Consommateurs, 2eme 
rapport au President de la Republique et au Parlement, 1986 (cited in-
fra as Commission, 1986), 13. 
20 Pizzio, 1984, 15. 
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the preliminary draft had focused on "condition anormale 
d'utilisation" (improper use), thus considerably contributing to 
heating the debate. Efforts then concentrated on clarifying what 
was to be understood by "autres conditions raisonnablement 
previsibles par le professionnel". The French debate becomes 
comprehensible only if it is borne in mind that consumer organi-
sations were pressing for adoption of "improper use". Tue move 
away from "condition anonnale d'utilisation" made two things 
clear: (1) improper use resulting from culpable conduct by the 
consumer was not to be covered by the general clause; (2) on the 
other band, foreseeable collective error was to be covered. Tue 
parliamentary debate centred on the "condition anormale" alone. 
By contrast, there was wide unanimity about obliging manufac-
turers to take account not only of foreseeable conduct but also 
specifically of foreseeable misuse. But even the French formula-
tion of the general clause is of no further help when it comes to 
distinguishing collective foreseeable misuse from misuse that is 
unforeseeable because it is improper. The distinction will be left 
up to the judge, who will have to decide how far the marketing of 
a faulty product is criminal, or else to be compensated for by 
payment. This presupposes that in the specific case, an order has 
been issued that makes the general clause specific. 
lt is hard to give any meaningful summary of experience 
with the new product safety law of 1983. Tue fact remains that 
France is the only EC-country where a "safety philosophy" that 
explicitly includes foreseeable "misuse" does exist. 
21 On all this see Pizzio, 1984, 15-17. 
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1.3 Information policy and the Commission for Consumer 
Safety 
A State policy on safety information has existed in France 
only since 1983. Tue 1978 law22, even though its title includes 
"information to consumers", provided no measures to meet the 
consumer's specific safety requirements. lt was only with the en-
actment of the 1983 law23 and the creation of the Consumer 
Safety Commission that an instrument aimed essentially at im-
proving information could be said to exist. 
1.3.l lnformationfrom regulatory bodies 
Tue Commission has the task of gathering, analyzing and 
(within limits) informing the public of necessary data on product 
safety24. Tue establishment of a database is onbly possible if all 
authorities and institutions concerned with consumer goods and 
safety problems inform the Consumer Safety Commission of 
eventual infractions25. Theoretically, therefore, all authorities na-
tionwide would be obliged to notify the Consumer Safety Com-
mission of all damage, accidents, and suspicions that might have 
to do with the manufacture or use of an unsafe consumer item. 
Tue courts are included in the obligation of notification. In prac-
tise, this is a compromise in the dispute over the setting up a na-
tional accident surveillance system. Just as with other European 
Community Member States, France, too, in the early 1980's, gave 
out contracts for research into the feasibility of a national acci-
dent surveillance system to combat accidents and unsafe prod-
22 Op. cit., 14-15. 
23 See supra, note 13. 
24 Pizzio, 1984, 19-20. and the two annual reports of the Consumer 
Safety Commission (note 19 supra). 
25 Art. 14 (2) ofthe 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
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ucts26. Tue arguments adduced against the setting-up of a na-
tional accident surveillance system more or less coincide with the 
German stance against a Community one27. In fact, the Commu-
nity directive on setting up an accident surveillance system has 
overtaken developments in France28. Tue Consumer Safety 
Commission has, since its creation, done the necessary prelimi-
nary work to permit a nationwide accident surveillance system. 
To date, four hospitals have declared their willingness to co-op-
erate. Tue question of how far the notification obligation on 
French supervisory authorities is suitable for the establishment of 
a wider, or different, data picture is still open to debate. At any 
rate, the French courts have been de facto refusing co-opera-
tion29. Tue Commission's 1985-6 annual report allows no conclu-
sion as to whether the authorities furnish the Commission with 
information, or as to whether the infonnation that does come in is 
at all of technical use to these authorities. 
Tue Consumer Safety Commission is further responsible for 
sifting incoming data, determining significant points and select-
ing those to analyze further. Here it may draw on the help of the 
French laboratories. Its small staff makes it hard for the Commis-
sion to develop activities of its own to any noteworthy extent. lt 
is largely reduced to using factual and issue analyses from third 
parties, or to trusting to their quality. Co-operation has intensified 
in the second year of the Commission's existence30. 
26 Accidents Domestiques, 1981; cf. esp. the ministerial position on this 
report: Ronze, 1981. 
27 See esp. Ronze, 1981, in his "Resumee et Conclusions". 
28 See the Council decision of 22 April 1986 concerning a demonstration 
project with a view to introducing a Community system of information 
on accidents involving consumer products, OJ L 109, 26 April 1986, 
23; for details on this see Chapter III, 3.3. 
29 Fora criticism see Commission, 1985, 13. 
30 Thus Commission, 1986, 12-14. 
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Data evaluation finds its formal conclusion in the production 
of reports or parliamentary position papers. These are later pub-
lished in the activity reports for each calendar year. The Commis-
sion is aiming at publication in the French Official Joumal31. 
1.3.2 Consumer information 
The Consumer Safety Commission can also approach the 
public itself32. Though it is forbidden from sending reports or 
opinions to the press, it does have the possibility of publishing a 
summary. This has in fact been done and without objection. This 
means that the Commission has opened up a way of bringing 
safety problems in handling consumer goods to the attention of 
consumers. Tue Commission is at present considering how it can 
reach consumers more effectively. A quarterly publication of its 
findings, a safety bulletin as it were, might serve this end. For di-
rect contact with the consumer, however, it has not yet been de-
termined to whether the videotext system TELETEL, widespread 
in France (1.8 million users) can be successfully used to dissemi-
nate information. A pilot study has furnished conclusions about 
the prospects by the end of 198733. 
31 See Commission, 1986, 16-17. 
32 On this cf. Commission, 1985, 15. 
33 Commission, 1986, 5. 
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1.4. Preventive regulation of product safety34 
fu the whole conception of product safety law, the adminis-
trative regulation of product safety stands at the centre of interest. 
For it is only if the general clause can be made specific in further 
administrative measures that it can -- quite apart from the range 
of tasks of the Consumer Safety Commission - develop a legal 
effect on the commercial circles involved. The distinction be-
tween normal procedure and emergency procedure is central to 
an understanding of French safety law. 
1.4.1. The normal procedure for product regulation 
For removing unsafe products from the market, the law35 
provides for a still relatively cumbersome procedure, justified on 
grounds of finality and of possible heavy damages for the indus-
tries concemed. fu formal terms, the procedure can be split into 
two sections. The first phase takes place before the Consumer 
Safety Commission, which is called on by either the minister, a 
consumer organisation, the industry, trade or individual, to take 
up a problem. The Commission may also examine a matter itself. 
Once the procedure has begun, the Commission calls on experts 
from laboratories and other scientific institutions to evaluate the 
product. At the same time firms involved are consulted36. They 
can present their position and may make proposals for removing 
the hazard by modifying the product. The Commission has wide 
discretion as to how it acts during such negotiations. Only if it is 
convinced that the product fails to offer the safety required by 
34 The following account is based on the final report of the Commission 
de Ja Refonte (note 2 supra) and the explanations by Pizzio, 1984. 
35 Art. 2 ofthe 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
36 As stressed by Commission, 1985, 5. 
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Art.l does it fumish a recommendation as to how the ministries 
should respond to the hazardous aspects of the product. 
Tue second phase then takes place within the administra-
tion. Tue ministry or ministries are in no way bound by the 
Commission's suggestions. Their importance will ultimately de-
pend on whether the relevant ministries tend to follow the rec-
ommendations, or to incorporate them into measures to be taken. 
According to the text of the law, two categories are available: 
firstly, general measures laid down by way of regulation, 
that concem a wide range of products or of services. These 
regulations require agreement among several ministries as to 
whether there is, in fact the need to adopt a regulation; 
secondly, specific measures, referring to a named product or 
service which may be laid down by ministerial order. 
Agreement arnong ministries is necessary before action can 
be taken. 
By contrast, there are no differences as to the ministries' 
available means for banning a risk. Tue 1983 law considerably 
16 
expanded the arsenal for combatting hazards with respect to the 
1978 law37. 
1.4.2 The emergency procedure for product regulation 
However, the normal procedure is much too clumsy when a 
<langer that has arisen has to be responded to quickly. Accord-
ingly, the law provides for the possibility of emergency mea-
sures, to be adopted without involving the Consumer Safety 
Commission. At the same time, though, they are provisional in 
nature. The only requirement for initiating the emergency proce-
dure is the existence of an actual situation of risk. This need not 
be grave; it is the imminence of the damage that creates the ur-
gency, not the severity. Accordingly, a non-immediate risk situa-
tion justifies initiation of only the normal procedure, even if it is 
severe. With a view to increasing the range of possibilities of in-
tervention, the law38 prvvides for various types of emergency 
measure, which coexist: 
the minister, or secretary of state, responsible for consumer 
protection may adopt a provision, without involving the 
Consumer Safety Commission. This kind of measure is 
valid for at most one year: long enough for decision-taking 
within the normal procedure as to whether a definitive reg-
ulation should replace the provisional one; 
a judge too can issue a injunction order for recall of a prod-
uct. He makes bis decision on application from a consumer 
organisation or a ministry. The provisions upon rights to 
take action derive from the Loi Royer39. Tue injunction or-
der may not have a duration of more than six months. The 
normal procedure has then to be used to decide whether the 
37 On this see 1.5.2 infra. 
38 Art. 3 of the 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
39 Calais-Auloy, 1980, 205 et seq. 
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measure is to be maintained or suspended. Firms are no 
langer allowed, as hitherto, to market the products again af-
ter this period has expired. If penal proceedings are e~­
barked on, the examining judge or the criminal court 1s 
competent. Tue judge can take only specific measures re-
lating to a particular product; 
various administration officials specifically mentioned in the 
law40 may seize products and even have them destroyed. 
Such measures will lead to the commencement of court pro-
ceedings, with involvement of the public prosecutor within 
24 hours. A prerequisite is that the urgency of the measure 
be beyond all doubt. In cases of mere suspicion, the officials 
can only block the product for 14 da ys pending results of 
scientific and technical tests. Whatever the outcome of the 
measure, a copy of the record of proceedings is to be sent to 
the Consumer Safety Commission. 
lt is still quite unclear whether the emergency procedures 
will make headway. 
1.5 Post Market controls 
Any description of French safety law has to go thoroughly 
into the administration's role in follow-up market controls. Ne-
glecting the whole repressive control machinery would give a 
completely distorted picture of French product safety law, since 
this is the area where control is centred41. The repressive powers 
will first be described (1.5.1), and then a special description of 
recall given (1.5.2). 
40 An. 4 of the 1983 Act (note 13 supra). 
41 On this see the account by Pizzio, 1984. 
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1.5.1 Repressive product regulation 
Scarcely anywhere else in French safety law does the frag-
mentary nature of its provisions emerge more clearly. This con-
cerns, in part, the substantive legal requirements for action by 
way of post market control. There is nothing in the 1983 law that 
makes marketing unsafe products a crirninal offence42. Were that 
so, the control authorities could engage in post market controls 
without first having to specify their powers by ordinance or min-
isterial decree. In the absence of any ordinance laying down spe-
cific penal sanctions for the manufacture and distribution partic-
ular products or groups of products, the only grounds for inter-
vention have to be based Art. 1 of the 1905 law in its 1978 ver-
sion. Since that date, the scope of Art. 1 has included acts of de-
ception in connection with the use of the item to be sold43. Thus, 
for instance, sale of a hazardous product can be punished if the 
risks ought to have been previously brought to the buyer's atten-
tion. Tue fragmentariness of the 1983 Act in regulation is still 
more striking when it comes to the question of who enforces the 
law. Tue 1983 Act creates no administrative infrastructure, no 
special safety authority with hundreds of inspectors, but merely 
extends the area of action of the "Direction Generale de la Con-
sommation et de la Repression des Fraudes" (DCRF)44. Admit-
tedly, the 1905 law 45 also extended that body's powers of inter-
vention; in part, to specific controls on products, but in a more 
general sense, i.e. to the whole area of application of the 1905 
law. This composite makes it hard to understand the control ma-
chinery, for outsiders and authorities as weil. 
42 Significantly, the Commission de Ja Refonte (note 2 supra, 82) calls for 
precisely th1s general penal clause. 
43 Calais-Auloy, 1980, 128. 
44 Pizzio 1984, 19 et seq. 
45 Loi du ler aoilt 1905 sur !es fraudes et falsifications en matiere de pro-
duits ou de services. 
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The first step in control is the search for and establishment 
of breaches of the law. Tue relevant provisions of the 1983 law 
on the one band, strengthen existing intervention powers of 
DCRF officials, and on the other, create new control instruments. 
A full picture cannot be given; we shall confine our description to 
an outline of the chief powers46. 
The officials have a right to enter firms' premises at any 
time of day or night. This access right is now extended to rooms 
not used exclusively for business purposes but also private ones. 
Should the person concerned refuse access, officials may inspect 
the premises only if the public prosecutor gives them permission. 
More recently, the officials have also been given the right to in-
spect production documents. Without prior court permission, they 
can seize dangerous products or remove them. 
lf breach of the law has been found, a broad range of sanc-
tions is available. The prerequisite is either that a decree provides 
for punishment for the manufacturing or marketing of an unsafe 
product, or that the intervention requirements of Art. 1 of the 
1905 Act are present. Sanctions available under the 1983 Act 
centre around a range of measures besides punishment that can be 
ordered at the time of sentencing. This requires the issuing of a 
decree in the normal procedure or eise the issuing of a ministerial 
order in the emergency procedure. Three types can be distin-
guished: the court may order publication of the decision or re-
quire specific information of the public; it may order recall or de-
struction of the product at issue; it may confiscate illegally ac-
quired gains. 
In addition to the new provisions on measures accompany-
ing punishment, mention should also be made of the codification 
of long-standing case law of the Higher Criminal Court, accord-
46 This account is based on Pizzio, 1984, 19 et seq. 
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ing to wbicb tbe manufacturer of a product infringes upon Art.1 
of tbe 1905 Act if be brings a product to market without first 
cbecking that it complies with safety and bealth provisions in 
force. Tue Higber Criminal Court bad viewed criminal responsi-
bility of the manufacturer as establisbed wben, against the ex-
plicit tenor of Art. 1, be could be accused merely of gross negli-
gence47. Tue regulations take over tbe case law, but do not extend 
it to mere dealers. That does not mean, bowever, that dealers can 
escape their responsibility. Frencb case law48 bas long recognised 
that tbey can be made responsible under the provisions of Art. 1 
of the 1905 Act if they bave neglected any of their specific duties 
(unsuitable storage, inadequate conservation, inadequate la-
belling). Indeed, a trader bas even been condemned for breacb of 
Art.l of the 1905 Act because be bad distributed goods wbose 
nonconformity with the legal provisions was clear. 
Tue closeness in content to comparable efforts at differenti-
ation of product liability in German case law is evident. But 
wbile in the FRG breacb of duty by tbe manufacturer or trader as 
a rule leads to entitlement to compensation for damage, France 
relies more intensively on an administrative solution to the prob-
lem. Tue parallel is interesting above all from the viewpoint of 
allocation of the burden of proof. German civil case law consid-
ers infringement of safety provisions in force (or non-compliance 
witb technical standards) as a prima facie indication of the de-
fectiveness of a product and therefore also of fault. But prima fa-
cie rules of this kind are not enougb to justify criminal condem-
nation of the manufacturer. In principle, the administration bas to 
sbow tbat the manufacturer bad not carried out the necessary 
cbecks. This seemingly clear burden of proof is bowever brougbt 
into question by Art. 7 of the 1983 Act. Art. 7 states that a manu-
facturer wbo bas not officially observed prescribed cbecks on 
47 Calais-Auloy, 1980, 129, and references from the case law. 
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verification of compliance with the law has, unless the contrary is 
shown, infringed Art. 1 of the 1983 Act. But there is a difference 
between Art. l of the 1983 Act and Art. 1 of the 1905 Act insofar 
as the 1983 Act lacks a criminal law general description of an of-
fence, allowing condemnation merely because a product does not 
comply with the requirements of the general clause. Nevertheless, 
one may envisage types of cases in which the presumption under 
Art. 7 of the 1983 Act leads to condemnation under Art. 1 of the 
1905 Act49. 
1 .5 .2 Product recalls 
Tue 1983 Act for the first time, provides the possibility of 
ordering he recall of a product. This requires either the issuing of 
a regulation or in urgent cases, a ministerial order. 
Art. 2 says: "These regulations may likewise specify 
that products be removed from the market or recalled 
for modification, that the purchase price be reimbursed 
in whole or in part or products be exchanged, and that 
consumer information obligations be laid down". Art. 6 
says: "They (the Ministers responsible for consumer 
protection or the departmental Minister concemed) 
may also order the publication of wamings and pre-
cautionary measures for use, as well as recalls for ex-
change, repair or full or partial reimbursement of the 
purchase price". 
To avoid misunderstandings, it should be clear that the 
Courts, too, can order recalls on the basis of Art. 1 of the 1983 
Act, without being empowered by a regulation or ministerial or-
48 On this Pizzio, 1984, 25, No. 47. 
49 Op. cit. 
22 
der. To date, no use has been made of the regulatory powers of 
Art. 2. 
Conversely, it would be wrong to conclude on the basis of 
the formal absence of regulations that product recalls with in-
volvement of governmental bodies do not take place in France. 
0. Dellenbachso has presented a case study that draws a strict 
distinction as to whether the safety threshold appearing in techni-
cal standards was demonstrably set too low, or whether a safety 
Standard existed at all. In the first group of cases, Dellenbach has 
concentrated on three cases that caused much furore in France in 
the second half of the l 970's: ( 1) crash helmets that were sub je et 
to material fatigue; (2) fan heaters that easily caused fires; (3) 
electrically unsafe automatic egg boilers. In spite of all the differ-
ences in detail, the three cases took an almost identical course. 
Tue unsafeness of the products was discovered after a series of 
product tests. Attempts by consumer organisations to negotiate an 
agreement with the manufacturers on possible recall and its terms 
were to no avail. Tue consumer organisations then went before 
the public, while informing the competent authorities of the 
safety risk. Under public pressure, the French administration saw 
itself compelled to put pressure on the finns to ensure recall of 
the products. 
Tue picture is less clear cut in areas where the technical 
standards contain no safety requirements: carry-cots and child-
proof seals on cleaning products. Once again it were consumer 
organisations that discovered the problem. Tue campaign for 
child-proof seals gained additional weight through the involve-
ment of anti-poison centresSI. Tue campaign against unsafe 
carry-cots led, after six years, to the establishment of a technical 
standard, which was however declared non-binding and did not 
50 For an account of the issues, see Dellenbach, 1984, 32-44. 
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cover other similar dangerous products. French consumer organi-
sations bad asked for the passing of a relevant regulation, on the 
basis of the Act of 10 January 1978 (the predecessor of the 1983 
Act). Tue fight for child-proof cleaning product containers ulti-
mately led to adoption of a regulation on the basis of the Council 
Directive of 18 September 1979; this concemed the harmonisa-
tion of legal and administrative provisions for the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances (Art.15(2))52. 
Far more interesting than the course of proceedings in this group 
of cases is an international comparison of delays in making a 
regulation. In Britain a safety standard for carry-cots has been in 
existence since 1965, and child-proof seals have been compul-
sory in the U.S. since 197053, 
1.6 Liability54 
Following the development of contractual guarantee liability 
and of liability in tort virtually irrespective of fault between 1962 
and 197255, French case law in the next ten years went on to 
make a considerable contribution towards bringing the two types 
of liability closer together56. While the rule of non-cumulation (of 
51 Activite des Centres Anti-Poisons, 1982. 
52 OJ L 259, 15 October 1979, 10. 
53 On issues connected with this regulation see Viscusi, 1985, 537 et seq.; 
see also Chapter II, 4.6. 
54 The following account is based essentially on Viney, 1975; Ghestin, 
1983 and Lamy Commercial, Concurrence-Distribution-Consomma-
tion, 1.985, ~28? e~ seq„ Nos. 4678 et seq.; a description from a Ger-
man v1ewpomt 1s g1ven by Weber/Rohs, 1984. 
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See G~estin, 1983, 244 et seq. (esp. 251 et seq.), who follows the 
stage~ m the case law <?n the developi:nent. of guarantee liability irre-
~pecttve of fault. There 1s no key dec1s1on hke the German Hühnerpest 
Judgment (BGHZ 51, 90 et seq.) in the law of contract. The case is dif-
ferent in \aw of tort. Here the decisive judgment that altered the burden 
of proof m favour of the consumer was Cour de Cassation Civile, 21 
claims based on contract and tort) continues to apply, the case 
law has nevertheless de facto developed a unitary concept of 
fault for both law of tort and law of contract. This unitary concept 
of fault is based in law of contract on liability of the professional 
vendor, or eise through direct liability of the manufacturer, while 
in law of tort it leads to liability irrespective of fault as the out-
come, at least where the injured party was demonstrably supplied 
with a faulty product57. Tue injured party to the contract has the 
burden of proving that the defect had arisen before supply. This 
allocation of the burden of proof may lead to problems, particu-
larly in supply chains where it can no longer be determined 
where the defect arose. Liability in tort presupposes, as in Ger-
man law, that the injured party can show the defectiveness of the 
product. 
A second important approximation of law of contract to law 
of tort lies in the development of groups of cases comparable to 
those in German law. This is true at least for defects in design, 
manufacture and instmctions. Development defects can consis-
tently be covered only by contractual liability in France. Con-
versely, as far as can be seen no duty to monitor products (post 
market or post sale duties) seems to exist in law of tort. 
Tue approximation of the two types of liability has been 
considerably strengthened by adoption of the product liability di-
rective58. Tue typically French problem of two types of liability 
according to whether the contractual partner or an uninvolved 
March 1962, Bull. Civ. I, 155. Otherdecisions in this connection are in 
Viney, 1975, 76, note 19. 
56 Much information can be found in Lamy Commercial (note 54 supra), 
1286 et seq., Nos. 4678 et seq. A description of the legal position from 
a German viewpoint is offered by Weber/Rohs, 1984. 
57 References in Lamy Commercial (note 54 supra), 1288, No. 4683. 
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third party is the injured party was eliminated at the preparatory 
stage of the Community directive in favour of a unitary type of 
liability for injured contracting parties or an uninvolved third 
party. Though national law on contractual liability continues to 
exist, the classical distinction loses significance in practice. 
An admittedly cursory survey of French case law seems to 
conclude that consumer disputes are of prime importance, but 
also points out that the most significant cases of injuries were in-
volving specifically French peculiarities. Since no central gas 
supply was provided in France into the 70's (and to some extent 
is still not today), many households need to store propane gas 
containers. Tue explosion of these containers during transport, on 
consignment or in use, have much concemed the French courts 
and made their contribution to the development of manufacturer 
liability in tort. A second specifically French variant in the devel-
opment of manufacturer liability is the great importance of liabil-
ity cases connected with the production, supply and use of agri-
cultural products. Characteristically, French case law has trans-
ferred strict contractual liability to agriculture, without any beat-
ing about the bush59. Correspondingly, the French bill to imple-
ment the product liability directive is likely to include agricul-
tural products60. 
France is ahead of all Member States in almost fully unify-
ing the concept of defect in the area of prevention and repair. Art. 
1 of the 1983 Act and Art. 6 of the Product Liability Directive, in 
the French version, are very similar, and in part identical in tenor. 
58 Ghestin, speech at the Conference "Securite et Defense des Interets 
Economiques des Consommateurs. Droit National et Communautaire" 
17-18 April 1986 in Dijon. ' 
59 Lamy Commercial (note 54 supra), 1289, No. 4687 b). 
60 Directive on liability for defective products of 25 July 1985, OJ L 210, 
7 Augu.st 1985, 29; more m Chapter III, 3.5. An official French bill 
convenmg the Directive is not yet available. 
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Throughout negotiations on the Product Liability Directive, 
France largely managed to push through its notion of defect61• 
1.7 Technical standardisation and product safety62 
Tue basic structure of French standardisation, with its pecu-
liar interweaving of government and the economy, was created 
by the Vichy Government in 194163. lt gives the French Gov-
emment great influence on standardisation that goes beyond a 
single company. This influence primarily affects the organisation 
of standardisation. This is largely integrated with the national 
administration, if not organisationally then at least functionally. 
The Commissioner for standardisation exercises the office of 
Government Commissioner in AFNOR. AFNOR and the Bu-
reaux de Normalisation (trade associations for standardisation) 
are part of the Service Public, i.e. they are comparable with firms 
under controlled administration. AFNOR's statutes are laid down 
by the State, which also determines and appoints its decision-
making bodies. A special statute provides for financing of 
AFNOR through a parafiscal levy. Another peculiarity is the pos-
sibility of giving technical standards, gradations of legal effect. 
The range goes from quasi-binding for the administration to uni-
versal bindingness for the economy. 
61 This is largely due to Ghestin himself, who was involved in the gov-
ernment decision-making process in France and likewise belonged to 
the Commission de Ja Refonte which had worked out the 1983 Safety 
Act; see also Ghestin (note 58 supra). 
62 A fundamental account in Gem1an is Lukes, 1979, 5 et seq.; the de-
scription is based on his account. Much information on the history is 
also in Rasera, 1980, 28 et seq. 
63 The relevant acts, decrees and orders are reprinted in Germon/Marano, 
1982, 109 et seq. 
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1.7.1 Privatisation trends 
A multiplicity of ministerial decrees and orders over the 
decades has not shaken the basic division of tasks. Tue decree of 
26 January 198464 on the status of standardisation also maintains 
the basic structure. At the same time, one may note a shift in re-
sponsibilities within the fixed framework from the State towards 
AFNOR, i.e. the private standardisation organisation. This devel-
opment was actually already introduced with the 1941 Decree. 
Until last year, France had pursued the intention of organising 
standardisation govemmentally6s. Accordingly, AFNOR had no 
standardisation powers. It was only to encourage the drawing up 
of standards, verify the proposals from the standardisation asso-
ciations and propose them for recognition by the Comite 
Superieur de Normalisation. Tue 1941 Decree clearly cut back 
administrative standardisation activities. This continues to be 
possible formally, but the emphasis in governmental activity has 
since been on the supervision exercised by the Minister for Trade 
and Industry or the Minister for Agriculture over all technical 
standardisation above company level. In practice, this control is 
exercised by a high official in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
the Commissaire a la Normalisation (Commissioner for stan-
dardisation). Tue Standardisation Commission is at the top of the 
French administrative hierarchy. Only five people work in it: the 
Commissioner himself, a deputy and three clerks. This small staff 
contradicts glaringly with the broad tasks assigned to the Com-
missioner by the 1941 Decree. He is not only to lay down general 
guidelines for the drawing up of standards, supervise the applica-
tion of standards and decide on applications stemming from 
them, and supervise the work of the French standardisation agen-
cies, but also - at any rate theoretically - to verify the content 
of each individual standard. In this he was supported at the time 
64 J?ecret n<?. 84-?4 du. 26 janvier 1984 fixant Je statut de Ja normalisa-
l!On, repnnted m Enjeux No. 44, 2/1984 52 et seq., andin German in 
DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 255 et seq. 
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by the Comite Consultatif, which was later absorbed by the 
Comite Supeneur de Normalisation. Tue wide range of tasks led 
to manifold difficulties, which the Commissioner sought in 1964 
to eliminate by abandoning practically all technical control66. But 
the Commissioner was unable to perform the other control tasks. 
In practice, what emerges as its most important task is the organi-
sation of communication between ministers interested in stan-
dardisation and AFNOR, or the Branch Standardisation Com-
mittees. Tue relationship between the Commissioner for Stan-
dardisation and AFNOR as newly regulated in the 1984 Decree, 
takes account of developments over the last 20 years. Registra-
tion of technical standards had de facto been transferred to 
AFNOR before 1984, and it now decides on homologation as 
well67. All that remains of the former wide powers of the Com-
missioner for Standardisation is the duty of supervision and the 
right to veto. Tue Commissioner has also given up his arbitration 
role in standardisation committees, which had often given 
grounds for criticism68. 
1.7.2 Democratisation tendencies 
Tue stepwise privatisation of standardisation - from gov-
emmental standardisation pre-1941 to comprehensive supervision 
and control over privately organised standardisation, from recog-
nition of privately organised standardisation subject to an ulti-
mate govemmental veto - has run parallel with a process of 
democratisation of the guidelines of standardisation policy69. Tue 
65 Rasera, 1980. 
66 On this Lukes, 1979, 22. 
67 See 1.7.4 (1) infra. 
68 Germon/Marano, 1982, 69 et seq.; Annex 2, "Rapport du groupe de 
travail - Normalisation et securite des travailleurs'. 
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term democratisation is justified in so far as the circles of partici-
pation in policy fonnation have been steadily enlarged. While in 
the Comite Superieur de Normalisation, the State bad dominated 
policy formulation; the economy was already given a place in the 
consultative activity of the Comite Consultatif. Creation of the 
Standardisation Supervisory Board70 completed the opening to 
consumers and trade unions, which now have a seat and a say in a 
body with an important political role. "Tue Standardisation Su-
pervisory Board shall propose to the Minister for Industry, taking 
account of national and international economic requirements, of 
the major national programmes and of the special needs of both 
sides of industry as expressed in the economic plan, the general 
orientation for standardisation work"7I. Though without powers 
of decision, the Standardisation Board is to provide assistance in 
setting French standardisation policy guidelines. In other words, 
the French State is trying to compensate for its retreat from stan-
dardisation by strengthening the participation of consumer Or-
ganisations and trade unions. Democratisation of policy forma-
tion cannot therefore simply be equated with greater orientation 
of standardisation policy towards the needs of consumer organi-
sations and unions. 
69 This process was introduced by Germon/Marano, 1982. On the "new" 
French standardisation policy, however, see also Marano, L'avenir de 
la nonnal}sation, 1982; Marano, Quelle normalisation pour de nou-
veaux enJeux, 1982 and Antonmattei, 1982. Deux grands principes 
amment la refonne: concertation et decentralisation, entreuen avec 
Laurent Fabius, Ministre de l'industrie et de la recherche, Enjeux No. 
44, 2/1984, 48 et seq. (in which the political objectives are very clearly 
express~d). From a German viewpomt, Schulz, 1983, and the German 
translauon of the address by Laurent Fabius at the first meeting of the 
Supreme Council on Standardisation, DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 610 et seq. 
70 See note 64 supra. 
71 From Art. l of the German translation of the Decree (note 64 supra). 
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1.7.3 AFNOR 
Tue stepwise shift of standardisation work from the State 
towards AFNOR has considerably affected its range of action and 
tasks72. Today, centralisation and co-ordination of all French 
standardisation activity is incumbent on AFNOR. It passes in-
structions from the Minister's authority on standardisation or the 
Commissioner for standardisation to the Bureaux de Normalisa-
tion and verifies their implementation. lt is responsible for sup-
porting technical standardisation committees in working out draft 
standards, and for homologation procedure. 
In practice, standardisation work lies largely in the hands of 
AFNOR itself. Tue industrial standardisation associations are of-
ten not financially in a position to set up their own technical stan-
dardisation committees and maintain them. AFNOR has to pro-
vide assistance, set up a technical standardisation committee in 
the technical sector concemed and support it with staff and above 
all resources. Yet AFNOR is not entirely autonomous here, since 
the setting up of a technical standardisation committee requires 
ministerial authorisation. 
1.7.4 Categories of standardisation 
Tue shift in powers from Government to AFNOR can be 
most clearly seen in the various categories of standardisation, 
only two of which are, however, important for our purposes: ap-
proved and registered standards73. 
72 AFNOR Statutes were also amended accordingly. Tue version adopted 
by the General Assembly on 7 December 1983 is reprinted in EnJeux 
No. 44, 2/1984, 55 et seq. 
73 Tue account in Lukes, 1979, 23-25, continues tobe pertinent. 
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(1) Approved standards have existed since 1941. These are 
standards that have been given official recognition by the State. 
Approval takes place through ministerial decree, and is published 
in the "Journal Officiel". Tue 1941 Act does not define in any 
more detail what the verification criteria in the approval proce-
dures are. Over-simplifying heavily, one might say that the 
Commissioner for Standardisation has to verify standards brought 
before him to see if they are against the "public interest". This 
category of Standards is the most important, both in number and 
in the importance of each individual standard. However, the 
numbers are steadily declining in relative terms. While in 1968, 
70% of all official French standards were still given approval, 
this percentage had fallen to 54% by 197214. Observance of gov-
emment-recognised norms was made compulsory for all national 
procurements by the 1941 decree. However, this obligation was 
not often applied in practice. Accordingly, the competent Minis-
ter, following detailed consultations between the various minis-
ters, the Commissioner for Standardisation and AFNOR, issued 
an administrative order75 whereby the bindingness of standards 
for govemment contracts in principle remained; the principle was 
not to be applied rigidly, but flexibly, in accordance with the 
needs of the Administration and of the general public. Pragmatic 
count was thus being taken of the actual facts. 
The 1941 Act also allows approved standards to be declared 
universally binding. Branches of the economy involved are then 
obliged to take the binding technical standards into account. The 
1941 Act, however, fails to clarify the conditions in which this 
declaration of universal bindingness can be made. With the re-
structuration of standardisation, the decision on approval of tech-
nical standards was transferred to AFNOR. AFNOR has to check 
74 Figures in Lukes, 1979, 24. 
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a proposed standard to see whether it is in line with the general 
interest and does not offer grounds for objections that might pre-
vent its adoption (as a government-approved norm). Approval as 
a norm is declared by AFNOR's Administrative Board, after the 
proposed standard has passed the verification and control proce-
dures. Tue Commissioner for standardisation can however op-
pose AFNOR's decision on approval of a draft standard. Decree 
No. 84n4 of 26 January 198476 contains no provision for the case 
where the Commissioner for standardisation makes use of his 
veto right. In particular, no procedure for taking up the conflict-
ing interests is provided for. 
At the same time, the Decree of 26 January 1984 once again 
confirms the bindingness of approved standards on public pro-
curements by the State, public bodies or state-subsidised firms. 
Therefore, the previous legal position has basically remained un-
changed. What is unusual, though, is the way in which the French 
Government seeks to stress this intention. 
Against customary usage, the Prime Minister bad a circular 
to this effect published on 26 January 198477. Its contents largely 
coincide with the 1971 compromise sketched out above. Tue cir-
cular nevertheless demonstrates how little attempts to increase 
the importance of the approved standards have bome fruit in 
practice. 
As before, approved standards can be declared universally 
binding. But the conditions under which a declaration of univer-
75 Circulaire du 15 janvier 1971 relative a une recornrnendation de Ja 
section technique de Ja commission centrale des marches publics con-
venant !es specifications techniques dans !es marches. 
76 J. 0., Fevrier 1984, N. c. 1127. 
77 Circulaire du 26 janvier 1984 portant sur Ja refärence aux normes dans 
!es marches pubhcs et dans Ja reglementation, J. 0., fävrier 1984, N. C. 
1127, reprinted in Germanin DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 257-58. 
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sality can be made are now specified. Art. 12 of the 1984 Decree 
says: 
"Where for reasons of public order, public safety, pro-
tection of the life and health of people and animals or 
safeguarding of vegetation, protection of national cul-
tural treasures of artistic, historical or archeological 
value or for compelling reasons connected with the ef-
fectiveness of tax inspection, the propriety of business 
procedures and the protection of the consumer, the 
need arises, application of a confirmed (approved) 
standard may by decree be declared mandatory, subje~t 
to the special exceptions provided for under the cond1-
tions of Art.18 (admissibility of possible departures)". 
This clarification was a response from the French Govem-
ment to frequent criticism by the European Court of Justice and 
the Commission of the EC, of the general provisions allowing 
standards tobe declared universally binding78. Tue links with Eu-
ropean law will be more specifically dealt with below. 
(2) Registered standards were introduced in 196679. They 
have since enjoyed a steady increase in popularity. This is shown 
inter alia by the fact that by 1972, 33% of all French standards 
were already in this category, whereas in 1968 the figure had 
been only 18%. This popularity is closely connected with the 
simpler procedure for bringing out a registered Standard. This 
category of standard is favoured above all in areas of rapid tech-
nical change. Registered standards have not been the object of 
governmental regulation to date. A change has taken place in 
practice, since registration initially took place through the Com-
missioner for Standardisation but has gradually passed into the 
hands of AFNOR. Registration is not bound up with any verifi-
cation of contents. lt takes place when the technical standards 
78 On the ba~k~ound to the problem see Lukes, 1979, 28. The European 
reference is discussed under 1.9.1 (3). 
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committees consider the standardisation procedure to be com-
plete and wish to make their results available to the economy. 
There is a link with approved standards to the extent that regis-
tered standards often constitute a preliminary stage towards gov-
ernment-recognised Standards. 
1.8 Certification and product safety 
No special certification procedure for verifying safety stan-
dards, nor offering an extemal indication of them by a special 
safety mark exist in France. Tue proposal by C. Germon and P. 
Maranoso to introduce a special safety mark, on the model of the 
German regulations, was rejected, for unknown reasons. Ac-
cordingly, safety can be an object of certification only along with 
other characteristics of the product. Types of this comprehensive 
certification are the mark of conformity (Norme Fran~aise) and 
the qualification certificates (Certificat de Qualification). 
1.8.1 NF mark of conformity 
Tue conditions for awarding the French mark of conformity, 
NF, are regulated by a decree of 194281. To that extent, certifica-
tion was an integral part of the overall reorganisation of stan-
dardisation in 1941-43. Tue mark of conformity can in principle 
be issued for any product but is in practice more important for 
household appliances. Tue mark testifies that the product bearing 
it has met the standards drawn up by AFNOR or the standardisa-
79 Lukes, 1979, 25. 
80 1982, 52. 
81 Reprinted in Germon/Marano, 1982, 124 et seq.; described in Lukes, 
1979, 50 et seq. 
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tion associations, and subsequently been given approval. lt is in-
cumbent on AFNOR to check whether the product in fact meets 
the standard. From this standpoint, the NF conformity mark pro-
vides objective information. However, this information is often 
misunderstood by the consumer. Consumers believe that the con-
formity mark indicates a particularly high quality of product, 
whereas in fact the standard merely lays down a kind of mini-
mum82. This problem is quite common and arises in other coun-
tries too. Tue safety of a product can theoretically be checked by 
the legally prescribed procedure where the underlying norm reg-
ulates important elementary characteristics of the product. This is 
exactly what happened with the technical standard on durability 
of crash helmets, since the French Govemment has by decree, 
obliged all crash helmet manufacturers to put their product 
through certification procedures. This is, however, a unique ex-
ception83. 
Criminal penalties can be derived from Art. 1 of the 1905 
Act, if the manufacturer uses the NF conformity mark without 
authorisation. Tue civil-law position is not as clear84. Tue pur-
chaser can, referring to the absence of conformity, terminate the 
contract and perhaps even claim compensation for damages. But 
the purchaser may also by Art. 1382 of the Code Civile claim 
damages from the Certification Office itself, if it has neglected to 
exercise its control powers. Such a claim for damages is a purely 
hypothetical case, as even AFNOR is not in a position to set up 
an all-embracing control network to guarantee disclosure of in-
fringements. Moreover, in the event of unauthorised use of the 
conformity mark NF, it would have to be clarified to what extent 
82 Calais-Auloy, 1980, 94, No. 65. 
83 For an account of the issues see Dallenbach, 1984. 
84 ?3~ the possible legal consequences see Calais-Auloy, 1980, 95 f„ note 
36 
Art. 6 of the 1942 Decree ruling out such liability by the Certifi-
cation Office, still applies. 
1.8.2 Certificates of qualification 
The conditions for issuing certificates of qualification are 
regulated in the 1978 Act85, the predecessor of the 1983 Safety 
Act. The relevant passages have not been abrogated by the new 
Act. The motivation for the legal regulation of the issuing of cer-
tificates of qualification was the growing enthusiasm of industrial 
associations to pump up sales of their products by creating a 
quality mark for their association and regulating the certification 
procedure intemally. Fami!iar examples are "Coton Flor" or 
"Qualite France". A problem, and not only from the consumer's 
viewpoint, was that neither minimum nor quality requirements 
existed for awarding the certificates. A 197686 commissioned by 
the French Government called for an end to this confusion. ( for 
the sake of a properly functioning market ). 
The object of the 1978 legal regulations was to allow certifi-
cates of qualification only where they gave the consumer objec-
tive and comprehensible information on the characteristics of the 
product. This was to be secured partly by allowing certifications 
henceforth only by Govemment-recognised bodies. Tue compe-
tent Ministry, the Ministry for Industry, must verify the institu-
tion's impartiality during approval procedures, and guarantee in 
objective (technical) and personal terms, that the certification 
procedure can be properly carried out. By early 1984, 18 institu-
85 On this see Calais-Auloy, 1980, 95 (No. 9); Repussard, 1984 and Bon-
homme, 1984; and comprehensively Schroeder, 1984. 
86 Repussard, 1984, refers to this in his account, though without men-
tioning the exact title. 
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tions had been accepted, AFNOR foremost among them. This 
seemed to have put a stop to the practice of self-certification of 
products to promote sales, but only on paper, since self-certified 
products have not yet disappeared from the French market. 
In order to meet the self-set goal of providing the consumer 
with objective information, the legislature, would through the 
certification procedure, have to set minimum requirements for 
"quality". Tue difficulties of such an endeavour are obvious. The 
French legislature has dodged the issue by speaking merely of 
"certains caracteristiques" (certain characteristics), conveniently 
avoiding a more explicit definition of quality. lndustry associa-
tions and consumer organisations were given the task of specify-
ing through negotiations what the "certain characteristics" might 
mean in specific cases. These negotiations are given formal shape 
in an Advisory Commission to the Ministry for Industry. lt is not 
hard to see the opposing positions of the parties to the negotia-
tions. Tue consumer side sees the chances of objective informa-
tion as maximised, if quality is stalldardised. Standardisation 
must, Oll this view, cover the functiollal and utilitarian character-
istics of the product. Industry rejects the idea that quality can be 
stalldardised. Standardisation would allegedly eliminate differ-
ellces betweell products and threaten the mechanism of competi-
tion. Tue debate closely resembles the discussions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany Oll the meaning and purpose of compara-
tive product information on quality87. Tue German legislature, 
too, declined to define quality and handed over the task to both 
sides of the market. This road seems, in both countries, to have 
ended in a blind alley. Neither has arrived at any noteworthy 
amount of comparative quality information. Theoretically, the 
French model could also be applied to the issuing of safety cer-
tificates. But this aim would be obstructed by the one-sided sales-
87 On this see Micklitz, Three lnstances, 1984. 
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oriented regulation of certificates of qualification. Tue safety of a 
product can be used only to a limited extent to boost sales. 
1.9 The 1983 Actin the light ofEuropean Community law 
Tue object of this analysis is to bring the French viewpoint 
into the debate on European safety law. Tue sole basis for a 
treatment of the French position to date is the study by J.-P. 
Pizzio88. His whole portrayal is adapted to the French way of 
looking at things, to the extent that European Community law is 
also considered and analysed from the viewpoint of whether ad-
ministrative means of sanction are available to implement prod-
uct safety. European Community policy has always allowed 
Member States much leeway in their implementation of the sub-
stantive law. The report keeps to this premise89. Community in-
tervention with French administration arouses considerable mis-
trust. Tue inclusion of the Single European Act in the description 
gives Pizzio a chance to dive into the relationship between inter-
nal market policy and product safety policy in more detail. Since 
by contrast with environmental and labour protection, consumer 
protection was not included in the treaties as a policy objective, 
product safety must be subordinated to the goal of creating free 
movement of goods90. 
Tue analysis of the relationship between the Product Safety 
Act and European Community Law has been done in two stages. 
Tue 1983 Act is first checked for its interaction with free move-
88 Pizzio, 1986. 
89 Op. cit., 9-10. 
90 Op. cit., 15. 
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ment of goods, and then specifically for the effects of the new 
approach on French safety policy, and on the 1983 Act itself. 
1.9.1The1983 Actandfree movementofgoods 
(1) Scope of the 1983 Act: Art. 8 is aimed at regulating 
cases of conflict between Community law and the 1983 Act. The 
wording seems to make it clear that the 1983 Act is no longer ap-
plicable where the products concemed are already covered by a 
Community directive. An interpretation au pied de la lettre 
would have the consequence of excluding only regulation by 
Statute, while the French government would be free to regulate 
product safety by decree even in the event of conflict. This rather 
dishonest version is however immediately abandoned, and for all 
forms of regulation the substantive focus is whether the products 
have already been the object of a Community provision. lt fol-
lows that in cases of total harmonisation France retains compe-
tence only in emergency cases, provided for in the 1983 Act. But 
even here Community law can retain primacy over French na-
tional safety law as long as the harmonisation measure includes a 
special safeguard clause explicitly covering such emergency 
measures9I. 
(2) The duty to notify regulatory measures under the 1983 
Act: If these are measures to be taken as part of a normal proce-
dure, then the objective scope of the Directive of 28 March 
198392 covers a comprehensive obligation of notification includ-
ing now agricultural products, foodstuffs, medicaments and cos-
metics93. To date (1986) the duty of notification has become rel-
evant on two occasions, when the French legislature embarked on 
91 Op. cit., 19 et seq. 
92 OJ L 109, 26 April 1983, 8. For details on this see Chapter IV. 3. l. 
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specifying the general clause in the 1983 Act by issuing special 
decrees94. In the first case, Pizzio notes a delay of nearly two and 
a half months, but the proposed decree has not yet come into 
force in France. The second case is more interesting, above all 
because it involves the first decree issued on the basis of the 1983 
Act95. lt forbids the manufacturer, sale and importation of erasers 
that look like foodstuffs. The Community has since, in response 
to various national measures banning imitations of edible prod-
ucts, adopted a wide-ranging directive on products of misleading 
appearance that are liable to endanger consumer health or 
safety96. 
The notification obligation becomes more problematic in the 
case of an emergency measure97. Certainly, the Information Di-
rective provides for an abbreviated procedure, but localised bans, 
withdrawals from sale and the like, are not covered by the obli-
gation of notification. However, since the French "Commissaires 
de la Republique" have wide-ranging competencies regionally, 
there is a loophole here for measures regulating safety that might 
escape Community notice. 
Another question is the extent to which regional measures 
on product regulation are (or must be) notified to the Community 
on the rapid information system98. 
93 OJ L 81, 26 March 1988, 75. 
94 Pizzio, 1986, 31 et seq.; and basically Lecrenier, 1985. 
95 Of 18 fevrier 1986, published in J. 0., 28 fevrier 1986. 
96 OJ L, 11July1987, 49. 
97 Pizzio, 1986, 32. 
98 Council decision of 2 March 1984 introducing a Community system 
for rapid exchange of information on hazards in using consumer prod-
ucts, OJ L 70, 13 March 1984, 16-17. 
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Pizzio99 regards the notification procedure as extremely ef-
fective, since prior experience reveals that the Commission's con-
sultation procedures offer adequate possibilities for making na-
tional safety regulations compatible with Community Law. 
(3) Compatibility of the 1983 Act with Articles 30 and 36 of 
the EEC Treaty: "Measures having equivalent effect" discussed 
in Art. 30 EEC also include technical standards drawn up by 
AFNOR. A specifically French possibility of conflict results from 
the possibility of declaring standards legally binding by decree. 
Action was brought for breach of treaty, because of the legal 
bindingness of a technical standard on the manufacturing of re-
frigerators100. Following the Commission's intervention, France 
changed the scope and coverage of the standard but kept its legal 
bindingness101. Nevertheless France feels quite confident of its 
chances of justifying national health and safety provisions 
through Art. 36 EEC or the Cassis de Dijon Case Law on Art. 30 
EEC. 
1.9.2 The 1983 Act and the new approach to technical har-
monisation and standards 
In his commentary on the new approach to technical har-
monisation and standards, J.-P. Pizziol02 points to a number of 
noteworthy problems which are, however, only partly dealt with 
in his report: 
99 Pizzio, 1986, 33-34. 
100 Written Question N' 835/2, OJ C 93, 7 April 1984, 1. 
lOl ~S~ 1. 0., Novembre 1984, N. C. 10307; andin general Pizzio, 1986, 
102 Op. cit., 52 et seq. 
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Tue essential requirements should be defined in such a way 
as to be capable of leading to sanctions (behind this there is 
once again, the specifically French - administrative - ap-
proach to safety policy). 
Member States should be banned from subjecting technical 
products to prior approval procedures. 
Should consumer protection necessitate the inclusion to any 
!arge extent of technical specifications in the fundamental 
requirements, recourse to the new approach would, he says, 
not be appropriate. Deciphered, this means that Pizzio 
doubts the effectiveness of reference to standards in this 
very area of the safety and health of persons. 
Tue problem of certification could be solved following the 
example of the Franco-German bilateral model; i.e. mutual 
recognition of certification institutes and their certificates, 
and also mutual recognition of safety marks (though one 
would have first tobe created in France). 
In very general terms, the new approach claims to have ef-
fects on the relationship between product safety and technicaJ 
standards. Member States would have to adopt a policy of dereg-
ulation in the area of product safety. Accordingly, de jure or de 
facto binding technical standards would in the long tenn have to 
be broken down and adapted to the requirements of the common 
market. This would require the building up of trust in technical 
standardisation as a guarantee of product safety, but also, at the 
level of the Common Market, compel recognition of the equality, 
in principle, of safety levels, even where solutions differ. 
At the end of the report, PizzioI03 asks the decisive question: 
What happens when the Community has adopted a directive 
defining the safety requirements in principle but a Member State 
nevertheless wants to take national measures that go beyond the 
defined goal? Tue problem already arises with the Directive on 
simple pressure vesselsl04, which, in departure from A1t. I of the 
103 Op. cit., 65. 
104 OJ L 220, 8 August 1987, 48. 
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1983 Act is based on a safety concept that does not include fore-
seeable misuse. By a circuitous route through a treatment of the 
Cremonini v. Vrankovich rulingl05 of the European Court of Jus-
tice, Pizziol06 arrives at the foliowing conclusions: 
Tue primacy of Community law makes it compulsory to al-
low even products that would not comply with Art. 1 of the 
General Clause of the 1983 Act to circulate freely. 
(Although Pizzio does not say this explicitly, the differing 
safety concepts in the Community Directive on simple pre~­
sure vessels (usage in accordance with instructions) and_m 
the 1983 Safety Act would not be an obstacle to the capac1ty 
of their circulation). 
Recourse to Art. 36 would be open to Member States only 
when the basic requirements have not been fully defined. 
lt would follow that where the Community has adopted par-
ticular directives on the basis of the model Directive, a 
Member State would be able to pursue a national safety 
policy only in the context of the safeguard clause procedure. 
1.1 OThe bilateral agreement between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France on the removal of technical barri-
ers to tradel07 
In July 1983 Chancellor Kohl and French Prime Minister 
Mauroy agreed to the following measures on a reciprocity ba-
sis 108: 
105 E~ [1980) 3583, case 815n9, judgment of 2 December 1980. For de-
ta1ls on the Low VoltageDirective, see Chapter IV, 2. 
106 Pizzio, 1986, 68 et seq. 
107 On. this see Laurent, 1984; Winckler, 1984; Strecker, 1984; joint decla-
rat10n. by AFNOR and ~IN on standardisation, DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 
194 f„ Becker, 1985; Wmckler, 1985, Beauvais, 1985. 
108 Thus Becker, 1985, 37. 
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mutual recognition of safety standards of equal value from a 
technical viewpoint; 
improvement of relations between applicants and test cen-
tres; 
mutual recognition of test centres. 
Tue negotiations for converting the agreement into national 
law on each side were handed over to a Franco-German working 
party. Tue object of the following account is not so much to give 
a detailed analysis of the bilateral agreement as to attempt to es-
timate the effect and function of the bilateral agreement for a Eu-
ropean safety policy. 
1.10.1 Background to the bilateral agreement 
Immediately after enactment of the German Machine Pro-
tection Act (Maschinenschutzgesetz), various Member States 
were already active in Brussels to ensure that the Act would not 
have any negative effects on free movernent of goodsl09. Tue 
Federal Govemment agreed at the time to incorporate foreign 
standards, especially those of Community Member States, in a 
separate list accompanying the Machine Protection Act (today the 
Appliance Safety Act (Gerätesicherheitsgesetz)). AFNOR then 
drew up a sixty-page list of 1,000 French standards on technical 
devices, which was submitted to the German authorities. On the 
German side, however, the view was taken that it was impossible 
to take the French standards into account. Tue requirement for 
the incorporation of a note into the standards in the annex to the 
Act was tobe in compliance with the following three conditions: 
a) the French standards would have to be available in German 
translation. 
109 Strecker, 1984, 123. 
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b) the French standards would have to contain specifications 
on the safety of persons. 
c) the French standards would have tobe individually verified 
by an expert cornmittee. 
In fact, the Federal Government did not then meet its formal 
agreement. 
From the mid-70's onward, German technical Standards and 
therefore the Appliance Safety Act as well were increasingly un-
der fire from French criticsllO. There were reports of difficulties 
for French industry in exhibiting their goods at trade fairs in the 
Federal Republic. These obstacles to trade in themselves would 
hardly have been sufficient to make the technical Standards into 
an object of high-level politics. But the issue acquired greater 
importance when in the late 70's and early 80's, the French made 
a connection between their growing current account deficit and 
technical standards. In fact, according to Commission statistics, 
German consignments to France more or less doubled between 
1977 and 1982, thus rising by 100%, while in the opposite direc-
tion, the rate of increase was only around 75%111. We need not 
go into here whether there is indeed a connection between the 
balance of payments deficit and German standards as potential 
technical obstacles to trade. In any case, the French succeeded in 
moving in the European Community, in the person of DG III Di-
rector-General Braun. In a lecture to a German audience, Braun 
more or less adopted the French version as his own, by calling 
the Germans the secret sinners in the setting-up of non-tariff bar-
riers to trade. Encouraged by the press, the equation 40,000 Ger-
man standards = 40,000 technical obstacles to trade began to cir-
culate. 
110 Laurent, 1984, 117, 
111 Winckler, 1984, 120. 
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On the other side, the Germans referred to a practice of 
French authorities begun some time in the early 1980's of adopt-
ing decrees that de facto made the import of German products 
into France impossible! 12. These decrees for particular individual 
groups of products were always built up on the same pattem: (1) 
the product had to meet a French standard and (2) this had to be 
documented by a test certificate and a NF-mark. Tue majority of 
decrees concemed safety requirements for wood-working ma-
chinesI 13. 
These mutual reproaches led in 1983 to the surprising out-
come of a bilateral agreement. Apparently, following the contro-
versially pursued public debate, pressure to negotiate was so 
great on both sides that action had to follow. Tue exchange of 
ideas and information between the authorities and the relevant in-
stitutions intensified. One product of the intensified relationships 
was the colloquium organised in Strasbourg in June 1984 by the 
Franco-German society for science and technology on co-opera-
tion between German and French testing and standardisation in-
stitutions 114. At this conference, competent experts discussed the 
areas that the Community bad mentioned in the preliminary work 
on the model directive as deserving priority in harmonisation : 
construction, measuring equipment, materials testing and welding 
techniques. 
But the bilateral agreement did not fully meet with accep-
tance. Tue joint declaration by AFNOR and DIN makes reserva-
tions about the need for a bilateral level of standardisation 
clear115. Bilateral agreements might, from the viewpoint of the 
standardisation institutions, serve a transitional function only as 
112 Strecker, 1984, 123. 
113 On this see Becker, 1985, 34 and Table I. 
114 AFAST, 1984. 
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an interim solution for relevant problem areas, wbile in principle, 
standardisation at European or international levels was a goal. lt 
is bard to say bow far the commencement of an action for breacb 
of tbe Treaty against the Frencb decrees on admission of wood-
working macbines was directly or indirectly induced by the bilat-
eral agreementsll6, lt is, in any case, conceivable that through its 
action, the Community wisbed to pull the rug from under the bi-
lateral agreements between France and the Federal Republic. One 
indication in this direction is the alrnost complete identity in the 
thrust of the German and European criticisms of French adminis-
trative practice. In the action for breach of treaty, the European 
Community attacks precisely those market admission regulations 
on woodworking macbines that bad been tbe basis for the Ger-
man attacks on the Frencb Government 117. On the other band, the 
Commission's bill of complaint was not submitted to the ECJ un-
til July 1984, by wbich time the bilateral agreement bad long 
been concluded. 
1.10.2 Results 
Following the end of the political talks, AFNOR in an initial 
pbase, checked at tbe higbest level, 281 DIN standards in 19 
brancbes of industry (excluding electrical engineering) to com-
pare them with the 295 corresponding French standardslI8. This 
list was the starting point for initial activities by the competent 
authorities in both countries facilitating the circulation of goods. 
Tue conference organised by the Franco-German Society for Sci-
115 Joint declaration by DIN and AFNOR (note 104 supra). 
116 ECJ {1986] 4~9, case 188/84, judgment of 28 January 1986 - wood-
workmg machmes. On this judgment see also Chapter IV, 1.2.3. 
117 lt is sufficient to compare the decrees attacked by the Commission in 
case 188/84 (note 116 supra) with the survey in Becker, 1985, 35. 
118 Laurent, 1984, 118. 
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ence and Technology supplies further illumination as to the 
chances and difficulties for the bilateral agreement. In relation to 
the three objects of the agreement mentioned at the beginning, 
the following provisional balance sheet can be drawn up: (1) the 
chances for mutual recognition of standards differ considerably 
from one branch of industry to another. Tue Strasbourg confer-
ence brought out highly differentiated findings in the branches 
discussed there. Tue situation in the construction industry is so 
different in both countries that necessary research work would 
first of all have to be done in order to be able to define political 
goals. By contrast, the situation as regards measuring instruments 
is relatively clear. While there are considerable formal differ-
ences, in substance the two systems largely overlap. Harmonisa-
tion seems possible if the political will to break down the formal 
distinctions is present. Tue situation is different again in the area 
of welding techniques and material testing. Here the need for re-
moval of existing obstacles to trade seems to be very great, but 
the objective meets with both political and technical difficulties. 
Experts all agreed when it comes to electrical engineering. Here 
the international network of technical standards and testing cen-
tres is so widely developed that a bilateral agreement could at 
most have negative effects. 
Tue nature of the bilateral agreement has since become 
clear. lt is certainly not concerned with facilitating trade in con-
sumer goods. To that extent, there is only a very indirect connec-
tion with the topic being discussed here. However, the bilateral 
agreement is interesting in the way in which it uses techniques to 
make the legal systems compatible with the various foreign stan-
dards. 
Tue BMA has, according to information from the French 
Ministry for Foreign Trade and Industrial Development, pub-
lished an initial !ist C of 118 French standards 119 on the general 
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administrative provisions of the Appliances Safety Act. Tue list is 
based on an assessment that the French standards listed therein 
are, in principle, equivalent to the German standards contained in 
list A. Tue authorities should intervene only where there is reason 
to doubt whether the French standards correspond to the safety 
level prevailing in the FRGI20. 
French law requires different solutions, since it does not 
have the device of the derogating clause as in the Appliances 
Safety Act. Since manufacturers are obliged to comply with a 
norm specified by a decree (Arrete), German standards can be in-
corporated into the system only if they also meet this obligation. 
This presupposes abstract verification of the equivalence of Ger-
man standards before including them in the decree. The French 
Ministry for Industry has in this way incorporated 9 DIN stan-
dards important in the eyes of the German Federal Ministry for 
the Economy, into its system of binding technical standards, 
thereby giving them the same legal bindingness as the corre-
sponding French standards121. 
(2) To improve the relationships between applicant and test 
centre particularly in the case of small and medium-sized enter-
prises, both governments have decided to explain the bases of the 
test centres' activities and the relationship between test centre and 
applicant. In the meantime, circulars for the test centres, in ac-
cordance with the Appliance Safety Act, and general guidelines 
for applying the conformity tests in accordance with the French 
decree on standards, have been published122. Both publications 
120 Op. cit„ 37. 
121 Op. cit„ 37. 
122 Üp. cit„ 38. The Gennan paper was published in BArbBl. 11/1984 52. 
Cf. also Chapter II, 3.3.4. ' 
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explain the administrative, technical and financial aspects of the 
national confonnity tests. 
(3) There is still a long way to go politically, before test 
centres are mutually recognised. Although there is agreement that 
certificates or test marks probably cause greater technical obsta-
cles to trade than do different technical standards, the bilateral 
agreement has so far shown hardly any effect. Nevertheless, in-
clusion of the LNE (Laboratoire Nationale d'Essais) in the list of 
test centres under the Appliance Safety Act has begun. fuforma-
tion on this procedure is provided by the Joint Declaration by 
AFNOR and DINl23. 
"fu the area of certification with the NF mark and the 
DIN test and inspection mark, AFNOR and DIN will 
collaborate by, in principle, carrying out tests of prod-
ucts and inspections of methods of manufacture in the 
country of origin, and by systematically aiming at mu-
tual recognition of these tests and inspections in the 
context of and in implementation of, the regulations 
drawn up for the purpose by CENCER". 
This passage makes it clear that a strict distinction has to be 
drawn between full mutual recognition of test results and con-
veyance of certifying power to a foreign office. Tue furthest-
reaching goal is full mutual recognition of test results, but at pre-
sent efforts are being concentrated on conveying certification 
powers. This would mean, to give one example, that German 
testing institutions would be entitled to test French products to 
see whether they meet the requirements of the NF conformity 
procedures. Conversely, the Federal Republic has declared its 
willingness to grant French test centres the authority to confer the 
123 Joint declaration by DIN and AFNOR, DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984), 194-95. 
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German safety mark GS, if full mutuality is guaranteed "with the 
maintenance of the usual reservations"124. 
1.10.3 Effect and function of the bilateral agreement on 
the creation of a Community safety policy. 
Tue opposite poles of the analysis are an accusation of pro-
tectionism and a possible pioneering role. Protectionist tenden-
cies might be pointed to in the bilateral agreement because, in the 
European Community, a Franco-German axis has been built up 
that might have detrimental effects on integration in the common 
market. While list C under the general implementing regulations 
for the Appliances Safety Act is at least theoretically, also open 
for the inclusion of norms of other European Community Mem-
ber States, in France, explicit inclusion of foreign standards in the 
decree is necessary, in order to guarantee the possibility of in-
state trade. This cumbersomeness of the French administration 
has readily been treated as an argument for the flexibility of the 
German system of reference to standards. This would, however, 
be to overlook that an administrative act is also necessary for in-
corporation in the list. To that extent, the accusation of protec-
tionism applies both to France and to the Federal Republic. Tue 
tendency towards a Franco-German alliance within the Commu-
nity is strengthened still further if the fact is included, that with 
regard to standardisation, the French are concerned above all with 
information technology12s. Finally, the cautious attitude of both 
DIN and AFNOR should be pointed out, since both continue to 
maintain the objective of international standardisation and regard 
bilateral agreements as, at best, a transitional possibility, tending 
as they do to impede international trade in goods. 
124 Strecker, 1984, 124. 
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Yet there are positive things about the bilateral agreement, 
too. Mutual recognition of standards in special Franco-German 
committees is objectively nothing other than political harmonisa-
tion. Franco-German preliminary work, as done for instance at 
the Strasbourg colloquium in 1984, might thus accelerate proce-
dures in the Standing Committee. Possibly even more important, 
however, is the attempt to achieve mutual recognition of test 
centres. Tue model directive did not cover this issue126 and the 
standardisation organisations themselves have hardly made any 
progress outside the field of electrical engineering. A bilateral 
solution to this extremely important question might serve as a 
model for European regulations on mutual recognition. In very 
general terms, the bilateral agreement seems in relevant technical 
and political circles to have aroused considerable response and 
not only in Gennany and France. 
125 On this see Germon/Marano, 1982, throughout. 
126 See Chapter IV, 3.3.2. 
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Part 2: 
Consumer product safety law in Britain1 
The account is confined to England and Wales. 
54 
2.1 Introduction 
In the world's oldest industrial country, consumer product 
safety law has followed the path of development typical of most 
developed societies. lt follows the tradition of govemmental 
technical control beginning in the 19th century, and develops rel-
atively late out of technical (plant/factory) safety law and safety-
at-work law. Accordingly, it concentrates firstly on protection of 
life and Iimb. Its instruments are administrative control and 
criminal sanctions. Moreover, safety law for consumer products 
is, more than technical safety law and safety-at-work law, market 
regulation. That places it under stronger requirements as to eco-
nomic efficiency and public policy legitimation. In Britain, too, 
this ambivalence marks the structure of existing consumer prod-
uct safety law and the current debate on prospects for extending 
it. 
2.2 The Consumer Protection Act 1961 
2.2.J Pre-history 
Technical safety law in England and Wales stands un-
changed within the tradition of the heroic age of the 19th-century 
factory acts. This command and control model of government 
regulation of safety as a rule consists in a broad definition of 
goals by the legislator. To achieve the goal, an administrative 
structure is set up. To a great extent, the administrative body au-
tonomously determines measures to be taken in order to secure 
the legal objective. Implementation and verification is incumbent 
on an inspectorate on the spot. Accordingly, there is relatively 
wide freedom of action. Informal conflict settlement and co-op-
eration are clearly to the fore. Recourse to the criminal couns 
constitutes the ultimate - rarely used - legal means of sanction 
against safety infringements. While the Health and Safety at 
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Work Act 1964 - the first comprehensive regulation of British 
safety-at-work law - still largely follows this regulatory model 
(with a separate administrative structure), consumer product 
safety law took a different road from the outset2. 
Until the end of the 1950's, there were legal regulations only 
for individual cases of particular consumer products [Fabrics 
(Misdescription) Act 1913; Heating Appliances (Fireguards) Act 
1952; Oil Bumers (Standards) Act 1960]3. In 1959 the Comrnit-
tee on Consumer Protection was set up and in 1960 submitted an 
interim report, followed by a comprehensive final report in 
19624• Tue main impetus for this initiative came from the 
"consumer sovereignty fallacy", which could no Jonger be over-
looked. Tue Committee's proposal aimed at institutionalising 
consumer power in the form of a govemmental Consumer Coun-
cil made up of independent persons5. lts main tasks were to be: 
gathering information, verifying the existence of a need for po-
litical action and influencing the public to take specific con-
sumer-protection policy measures. Fifteen years later, the 1976 
Green Paper on consumer safety again advocated the setting up 
of a Consumer Committee6; 21 years later a consumer protection 
committee of this type was set up in France7. In Britain, by con-
trast, legislation took a different course. In 1961 - before the 
Committee on Consumer Protection bad finished its work but in 
implementation of some of the recommendations from its interim 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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On the development of consumer protection law in Britain in general, 
see Borrie, 1984. 
The latter two were repealed by the Consumer Protection Act 1961 and 
r~laced by safety regulations under the CPA: the Heating Appliances 
(!:'ireguards) Regulations 1973 and the Oil Heaters (Safety) Regula-
tions 1977. 
Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection, 1962. 
Op. cit., 278 et seq. 
Consumer Safety. A Consultative Document, Cmnd. 6398, London 
HMS0,28. 
report - a safety law covering all consumer products was en-
acted for the first time: the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). 
2.2.2 The content of the CPA 1961 
Tue Consumer Protection Act (CPA) of 1961, slightly 
amended in 1971and1977, is a mere framework law. lt does not 
itself contain any substantive regulations of relevance to safety. 
Essentially, it covers three points: 
Section 1 implements the main recommendations of the 
1960 Interim Report of the Committee on Consumer Pro-
tection8: the executive (the competent Secretary of State) is 
empowered to enact binding safety requirements for partic-
ular types of product where this appears advisable. Tue 
safety requirements relate to two things: 1) requirements on 
composition, content, planning, design, manufacture and 
packaging of products, to avoid danger to life and limb; 2) 
requirements on instructions and wamings to potential pur-
chasers. 
Section 2 contains the general obligation on every profes-
sional seller of the product in question, at all stages of trade, 
to observe the safety requirements fonnulated in the Safety 
Regulations. This duty of observance does not apply to in-
ter alia private sellers (Section 2 (3) (a) CP A) or exporters 
(Section 2 (3) (b) CPA). 
Section 3 regulates the sanctions for infringing the Safety 
Regulations. Infringements of the duty of observance pur-
suant to Section 2 are subject to criminal proceedings 
(Section 3 (2) CP A). In the event of damage, any person 
damaged by the unsafe product can raise criminal compen-
sation claims against the seller (offence of breach of statu-
tory duty - Section 3 (1) CPA). General common-law enti-
7 Cf. Chapter II, 1.3 supra. 
8 Interim Report of the Cornrnittee on Consumer Protection, Cmnd. 
1011, London HMSO 1960. 
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tlements to compensation remain untouched (tort and con-
tract)9. 
2 .2 .3 Assessment 
All in all, the CP A 1961 keeps to the approach of individual 
case regulation in safety law. Competence to regulate the indi-
vidual cases is simply shifted from the legislature to the execu-
tive. For enactment of safety regulations, the CPA makes no for-
mal approval by either House of Parliament necessary. Usually, 
though, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, a joint 
committee of both Houses of Parliament, is involved. Section 1 
(5) lays a duty on the Secretary of State to consult "such persons 
or bodies of persons as appear to him requisite" before issuing a 
regulation. A safety regulation can be suspended at any time by 
decision of either House of Parliament ("negative resolution pro-
cedure" - Section 1 (6) CPA). Tue CPA 1961 is innovative in its 
consumer protection policy effect in two ways: by extending the 
power of legal regulation to all consumer products and by mak-
ing safety regulation dynamic through delegating power to issue 
safety regulations to the executive without involvement of Par-
liament. One weakness is implementation. No separate hierarchi-
cal administrative structure was set up to apply the CPA. Verifi-
cation of observance of safety requirements was instead left to 
the local authorities, the trading standards officers of the local 
Weights and Measures Authorities. These are entitled - but not 
obliged (!) - to carry out inspections within the area of applica-
tion of safety regulations, and to take random samples of goods 
for further investigation. They are not given any further powers. 
In particular, the local implementing bodies cannot issue any 
prohibition orders. Over and above formal sanction, the CP A 
trusts to voluntary observance of the safety regulations and to the 
market-complementary method of consumer information or sen-
9 Cf. 2.7 infra. 
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s1t1sation. Altogether, between 1961 and 1978, eighteen safety 
regulations on the basis of the CPA were issuedlO. There do not, 
however, seem to be any indications as to how many sellers had 
10 Regulations made under the Consumer Protection Act 1961, Section 1, 
now in force. 
SUBJECT 
No. 
STATUTORYINSTRUMENT 
The Stands for Carry Cots (Safety) 
Regulations 1966 
The Nightdresses (Safety) 
SI 1610 
Regulations 1967 SI 839 
The Toys (Safety) Regulations 1974 SI 1367 
The Electrical Appliances (Colour 
Code) Regulations 1969 
The Electrical Appliances (Colour 
Code) Regulations 1970 
The Electrical Appliances (Colour 
Code) Regulations 1977 
The Electric Blankets (Safety) 
Regulations 1971 
The Cooking Utensils (Safety) 
SI 310 
SI 811 
SI 931 
SI 1961 
Regulations 1972 SI 1957 
The Heating Appliances (Fireguards) SI 2106 
(amended by Regulations 1973 1977/167) 
The Pencils and Graphie Instruments 
(Safety) Regulations 1974 
The Glazed Ceramic Ware (Safety) 
Regulations 1975 
The Electrical Equipment (Safety) 
Regulations 1975 and 1976 
The Vitreous Enamel-Ware (Safety) 
SI 226 
SI1241 
SI 1366 and 1208 
Regulations 1976 SI 454 
The Children's Clothing (Hood Cords) 
Regulations 1976 SI 2 
The Oil Heaters (Safety) 
Regulations 1977 
The Babies' Dummies (Safety) 
Regulations 1978 
SI 167 
SI 836 
The Cosmetic Ptoducts 
ECA 72) 
SI 1354 (amended by 
Regulations 1978 (also S 2(2) 
1984/1260; 
tobe revoked in 1988) 
The Perambulators and Pushchairs 
(Safety) Regulations 1978 
The Oil Lamps (Safety) 
SI 1372 
Regulations 1979 SI 1125 
(The Cosmetic Products (Amendment)Sl 1477 (revoked by 
Regulations 1983 (also S 2(2) ECA 72) 1984/1260) 
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proceedings brought against them in that period for breach of 
safety regulations. 
2.3 The Consumer Safety Act 1978 
2.3.1 Background 
A further stock-taking of consumer product safety law in 
Britain came fifteen years after enactment of the CP A, in the 
form of the 1976 Govemment Green Paper on "Consumer 
Safety"ll. This summarised the existing prospects for a British 
consumer product safety law, which in the later White Papers of 
1982, 1984 and 1985 where merely taken up again in part and 
given new emphasis. Four main points have been chosen to 
demonstrate shortcomings of consumer protection policy12: 
Lack of regular systernatic information on product-related 
accidents and of in-depth studies on the exact involvement 
in accidents of such products, or on cumulative causes of 
accidents; lack of international exchange of information; 
Lack of BSI standards for consumer products, and difficul-
ties in developing and/or updating them; 
Cumbersomeness and procedural restrictions of safety reg-
ulations, in particular the absence of any possibility outside 
the regulations to respond to new hazards, issue banning or-
ders, or have products recalled; 
Weaknesses in implementing safety regulations. 
Among the proposals for improving consumer protection, 
we shall here deal only with the set of technical standards. In or-
11 Consumer Safety (loc. cit, note 6). 
12 Loc cit„ 11-12. 
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der to secure a wider. range of specific technical standards, the 
Government is contemplating the following possibilities13: 
Introduction of special safety standards; 
Setting of time limits for developing new technical stan-
dards; in this context, adoption of the offeror procedure 
practised by the American CPSC is recommendedl4; 
Generalised formulation of safety requirements in safety 
regulations, even if no British Standard is available, so that 
manufacturers themselves can develop appropriate technical 
solutions; 
A shift to the method of non-binding reference to technical 
standards in safety regulations; 
Development of conformity marks; 
Encouragement of economic associations to develop self-
regulatory codes of conduct in the area of consumer safety 
law, similar to the codes in the area of competition law, en-
couraged by the Office of Fair Trading since 1973. 
2.3.2 The content of the CSA 1978 
An initial partial response to the criticism and proposals in 
the 1976 Green Paper was the Consumer Safety Act 197815/16. 
Tue characteristic of this Act, still authoritative today, is flexibil-
ity on the sanctions side. Tue rigid two-dimensionality of overall 
empowerrnent by statute and regulation of individual cases by the 
executive is abandoned. Besides the safety regulation, three other 
instruments are added to the executive's range of safety law mea-
sures; the prohibition order, the prohibition notice and the notice 
to warn. Tue only one important in practice is the prohibition or-
13 Loc cit., 16 et seq. 
14 Cf. Chapter II, 4.3.1. 
15 On the infonnation aspect cf. 2.8 infra. 
16 We shall not go into the technical legal difficulties arising from con-
tinued co-existence of the CPA with its regulations and the CSA. 
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der, which supplements safety regulations by acting as a time-
limited emergency measure. 
Tue CSA essentially contains five points: 
(1) Section 1 lays down "the law" of safety regulations. Tue 
objects of the regulations are firstly - here made explicit for the 
first time - the safety of consumer products17, and secondly the 
fumishing of consumers with appropriate information (Section 1 
(1) CSA). Tue way these goals are tobe met through the regula-
tions is set out in detail in Section 1 (2). A notable feature, as a 
further reflection of the proposals in the 1976 Green Paper, is the 
prominent place given to technical standards. Technical standards 
as a substantive reference point for safety regulations appear in 
four of the nine points. In the context of measures to inform and 
warn the consumer, marks are also explicitly mentioned. 
Tue procedure for enacting safety regulations is, by com-
parison with the CP A, made formal. Competence remains with 
the executive (Secretary of State). However, the duty of consul-
tation is extended. Tue Secretary of State is now obliged to con-
sult organisations that represent interests affected by the regula-
tion (Section 1 (4) CSA). One example of what this means is that 
in connection with the Novelties (Safety) Regulations 1980, 66 
people and/or organisations were consulted. Additionally, safety 
regulations must now be approved by both Houses of Parliament 
(Section 7 (7) - "affirmative resolution procedure")I8. Both 
mean considerable complication and prolonging of the procedure 
for issuing safety regulations. 
17 The concept "safe" is defined in Section 9 (4) CSA: "Safe means such 
as to pre"'.e~t or adequately to reduce any risk of death and any risk of 
personal lllJUry from the goods in question or from circumstances in 
which the goods might be used or kept, ... ". 
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(2) Section 3 regulates the new instruments of action. Tue 
clumsiness of the safety regulation procedure is evidently to be 
compensated here by opening up additional possibilities of rapid 
regulatory intervention. 
Prohibition orders (Section 3 (1) (a) CSA) are orders that 
prohibit the sale of a particular group of productsI9. Tue Secre-
tary of State has in principle to announce the issue of a prohibi-
tion order 20 days in advance, secure opinions and check those 
received. This "preliminary procedure" may be dispensed with 
only in urgent cases ("emergency procedure"). Tue prerequisites 
for an "urgent case" are not specified in any more detail. Prohibi-
tion orders expire by law after 12 months. Additionally, they may 
at any time be waived by decision of either House of Parliament 
(Section 7 (6) CSA). 
Prohibition notices (Section 3 (1) (b) CSA) are issued to a 
particular person. Tue procedure for issuing prohibition notices is 
regulated in Schedule 1, Part Il, CSA - in too much detail and 
out of all proportion to their practical relevance. Intensive ex-
change of information between the trader/importer affected and 
the Secretary of State is provided for. This seems to amount to 
legal regulation of the prevailing practice at the implementation 
stage of informal settlement of disputes. 
Notices to warn (Section 3 (1) (c) CSA) are instructions to 
suppliers to provide information or wamings on particular haz-
ards of products supplied by them20. 
18 Fordetails on procedure, see Weatherill/Woodroffe, 1985, 93 et seq. 
19 Details ofthe procedure are regulated in Schedule 1, Part 1, CSA. 
20 The procedure is regulated in Schedule !, Part III CSA. 
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(3) Contraventions of prohibition orders, prohibition notices 
or notices to warn issued by the Secretary of State are criminally 
(Section 2 CSA) and civilly (Section 6 CSA - offence of breach 
of statutory duty) actionable. 
(4) For the first time, a comprehensive information right of 
the Secretary of State is also given legal embodiment. He may 
secure information, call for documents and ask to see them, etc. 
Breaches of this duty on suppliers constitute an offence. 
(5) Section 5, taken together with Schedule 1, Part lli, reg-
ulates in detail the powers of the implementing agencies. These 
are - as under the CP A - confined to the right to enter business 
premises, see documents, take samples of products for further in-
vestigation, and where necessary, secure assistance from autho-
rised agencies to enter business premises by force and, in compli-
ance with prescribed procedures, forcibly open receptacles. 
2 .3 .3 Assessment 
Tue thinking of the CSA 1978 is characterised by the divi-
sion of labour between safety regulations and prohibition orders. 
Prohibition orders are a response to new types of product hazard. 
During their 12-month-duration, experience accumulated can be 
used to decide whether there is justification for extending the 
provisional measure into a safety regulation. Of the eight prohi-
bition orders issued under the CSA between 1978 and 1983, six 
have been converted into safety regulations. Prohibition notices 
and notices to warn played no significant role in practice. 
Statements on the effectiveness of the CSA in guaranteeing 
the safety of consumer goods can only be tentative. Compared 
with the eighteen safety regulations made under the CP A be-
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tween 1961 and 1978, fourteen were made under the CSA be-
tween 1978 and 198521. As regards formal punishments for con-
travention of safety regulations and prohibition orders, the gov-
emment's first five-year report (pursuant to Section 8 (2) CSA) to 
Parliament on practice with the CSA (and CPA), of 1983, gives 
the following figures22: 
Contraventions of safety regulations 
21 Regulations made under the Consumer Safety Act 1978, Section 1 
Subject Statutory instrument no. 
The Dangerous Substances and 
Preparations (Safety) Regulations SI 136 (amended by 
1980 (also S 2 (2) ECA 72) 1985/127) 
The Upholstered Furniture (Safety) SI 725 (amended by 
Regulations 1980 1983/519) 
The Novelties (Safety) SI 958 (amended by 
Regulations 1980 1985/128) 
The Filament Lamps for Vehicles 
(Safety) Regulations 1932 SI444 
The Upholstered Furniture (Safety) 
(Amendrnent) Regulations 1983 SI 519 
The Pedal Bicycles (Safety) 
Regulations 1984 SI145 
The Pedal Bicycles (Safety) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1984 SI 1057 
The Motor Vehicles Tyres (Safety) 
Regulations 1984 SI 1233 
The Cosmetic Products (Safety) 
Regulations 1984 (also ECA 72 & 
CPA 61) SI1260 
The Gas Catalytic Heaters (Safety) 
Regulations 1984 SI 1802 
The Food Imitations (Safety) SI 99 (amended by 
Regulations 1985/1191) 
The Dangerous Substances and 
Preparations (Safety) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1985 SI127 
The Novelties (Safety) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1985 SI 128 
The Food Imitations (Safety) Amendment Regulations 1985 SI 
1191 
22 According to Weatherill/Woodroffe, 1985, 122. 
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Period N umber of persons 
convicted 
Number of breaches 
ofthe law 
Nov. 78 - 31.3.79 
1.4.79 - 31.3.80 
1.4.80 - 31.3.81 
1.4.81 - 31.3.82 
1.4.82 - 31.3.83 
54 
98 
109 
185 
256 
59 
142 
158 
439 
665 
Much greater importance, however, attaches to "soft imple-
mentation", to co-operation between the on-the-spot implement-
ing agencies, the trading standard officers, and the manufacturers 
and traders concemed. 
Summarising, one may say that there is consumer product 
safety law in Britain only to the extent that safety regulations 
and/or prohibition orders have been issued under the CP A and 
CSA. Local implementing agencies can act only on the basis of 
these provisions for individual cases. Their powers are limited to 
the disclosure of breaches. They have no powers to prohibit fur-
ther sale of unsafe goods, far less order recalls of products that 
cause damage. The CP A and CSA continue the traditional dual 
strategy of British safety law unchanged: (1) voluntary compli-
ance with safety regulations following informal wamings from 
the authorities, and (2) where necessary, penal sanctions. Tue 
only additional possibility is an official Govemment waming 
through the media against buying particular products. 
2.4 Present prospects for development 
2.4.1 Legal reform projects 
Six years after enactrnent of the CSA, the 1984 Govemment 
White Paper "The Safety of Goods"23 took a new look at British 
consumer good safety law. Moving on from the fundamental 
23 Cmnd. 9302, London HMSO, July 1984. 
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Green Paper of 1976, it singles out the following two main weak-
nesses of the CSA. 
As regards implementation, the possibilities offered for pur-
suing the most effective and cheapest road to consumer protec-
tion, namely preventing unsafe products coming to market at all, 
are too slight. Obligatory safety checks or safety marks as legal 
prerequisites for sale are rejected, with explicit reference to 
problems in connection with Community law (technical barriers 
to trade ). Instead, more lasting preventive effects are expected 
from higher criminal penalties (higher fines), and extension of 
powers for local implementing agencies to make preventive 
checks is recommended. Moreover, local authorities have no way 
of preventing further illegal sale of goods or of withdrawing 
goods from the market that are clearly out of line with safety reg-
ulations or prohibition orders. Above all, institutional provisions 
are required in order to catch unsafe imports (specially from non-
EEC countries) at the frontiers. 
lt should be noticed in passing, that these suggestions 
led to an amendment to the CP A and CSA, the Con-
sumer Safety (Amendment) bill, which was enacted in 
August 1986. As regards the problem of checks on im-
ported goods, obviously felt to be urgent, the customs 
and excise authorities are given the right to impound 
imported products for 48 hours for investigation by the 
competent local implementing bodies. They have also 
to inform the competent bodies of any suspicions they 
mayhave. 
Tue range of instruments available to local imple-
menting bodies is extended by the introduction of the 
suspension notice. This allows the competent authori-
ties, on justified suspicion of infringement of a safety 
regulation or prohibition order, to issue sales bans valid 
for 6 months. Finally, for the first time (!), the possi-
bility is opened up of withdrawing unsafe products 
from the market. On application from a local authority, 
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a court may order the destruction or confiscation of in-
criminated goods. Recall procedure is still not provided 
for. 
The decisive step towards making British consumer good 
safety law effective is however seen as a change in the underly-
ing conception: replacement of individual case regulation through 
safety regulations and prohibition orders by generalisation of the 
safety law approach. Tue introduction of a general safety duty, 
already present in the Health and Safety at Work Act (Section 6 
HSWA) and favoured in the 1976 Green Paper, is once again ad-
vocated. This duty would require all manufacturers and traders 
(importers, wholesalers, retailers, etc.) to bring only safe goods to 
market in Britain. lt would allow the implementing agencies, 
without having to pass through safety regulations or prohibition 
orders, to proceed directly against any trader because of any con-
sumer product, provided it be unsafe. While the CSA 1978 was 
still endeavouring to give an exhaustive definition of the concept 
of safety (Section 9 (4))24, the 1984 White Paper completely 
abandons any such legal semantics of safety. The safety of con-
sumer goods is defined by referring to "sound and modern stan-
dards of safety". Tue 1984 White Paper has thus brought into 
consumer product safety law what was originally achieved in 
1974 by the HSWA, but later only hinted at by the CSA 1978: 
the step to delegalisation, or to "legislation by reference to stan-
dards" (J. Fraser). "Sound standards" are in the first place British 
Standards25, but also European and international standards that 
have been recognised as such. Observance of relevant standards 
24 Cf. note 17. 
25 In November 1982 a rnemorandum of understanding between Gov-
ern~ent. and BSI was signed, recognisi.ng the BSI as the national stan-
dard1sat1on b?<Iy a~d a1~ed at spe~dmg up _?,roduction of technical 
standards. lt 1s repnnted m the Wh1te Paper Standards, Quality and 
International Competitiveness", 1982, Annex A. 
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would indicate "due diligence'', and rule out criminal responsi-
bility26. 
Tue 1984 White Paper's approach - possibly influenced by 
similar considerations at the European level - very strongly links 
interests in the international competitivity of the British econ-
omy27 and in safety and consumer protection policies. Once this 
link is set up, experience shows that the latter have the worse of 
it. Tue consequences of this kind of "reference to standards" ap-
proach for consumer product safety policy are obvious, even 
though they have not yet been drawn and do not seem at all real-
isable: development of genuine (consumer product) safety stan-
dards and/or effective consumer involvement in the standardisa-
tion process. 
Tue 1985 White Paper "Lifting the Burden"28 again ex-
presses the Government's intentions in legal policy: to move to-
wards a genera1 safety duty and wind down single-case regula-
tion. This consumer protection policy approach is now even more 
closely tied in with an overall deregulation programme intended 
to eliminate needless regulatory burdens and costs for the British 
economy. 
26 For details see 2.7 infra. 
27 Cf. esp. the White Paper, "Standards, Quality and International Com-
petitiveness", London HMSO 1982. 
28 Cmnd. 9571, London HMSO, July 1985, based on an interministerial 
study on administrative and legislative obstacles for small firms in 
Britain: "Burdens on Business", London HMSO, March 1985. 
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2.4.2 Consumer Protection Act 1987 
In November 1986 the British Govemment published the 
draft of a Consumer Protection Bill29, which was passed by Par-
liament in summer 1987. Tue Consumer Protection Act 1987 
(CPA) contains three substantive sections: 
(1) Incorporation of the Community Product Liability Di-
rective into British law; (2) revision of the CSA 1978 by intro-
ducing a general safety requirement and (3) a regulation on de-
ceptive price indications. In this context only the second part, on 
consumer protection or consumer product safety ( consumer 
safety) is of interest. This part came into force in autumn 1987. lt 
thus brings both aims - generalisation of consumer product 
safety requirements and policy of reference to technical standards 
- into legislative practice. In the future, the supreme principle in 
British consumer protection law will be not to bring any goods to 
the market that "fail to comply with the general safety require-
ment". Consumer goods within the meaning of the Act are prod-
ucts intended for private use and consumption. Separately regu-
lated areas like cars, medicines, tobacco, etc. are excepted. 
Tue general safety requirement is not met if consumer goods 
"are not reasonably safe having regard to all circumstances" 
(Section 10 (2) CPA). Arnong such circumstances are mentioned: 
(1) characteristics of goods that would constitute a defect within 
the meaning of the Community Product Liability Directive; (2) 
technical (safety) standards; (3) the technical possibility of pro-
ducing a product more safely, if this is in reasonable relation to 
the costs incurred, etc. 
29 Reprinted in PHI 1987, 18-26. The Consumer Protection Act 1978 is 
pulilished by HMSO, London 1987. 
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Tue new Act does not apply to secondhand goods; to goods 
not intended for the British market; or to retailers to whom the 
lack of safety was not apparent. Moreover, it is always a suffi-
cient defence to show that the product meets the requirements of 
a safety regulation or a tested technical (safety) standard. Tue 
regulatory instruments of the CSA 1978, as last augmented by 
the 1986 Amendment, are unchanged. In particular, the general 
safety duty does not correspond to any general recall powers for 
the competent Government offices. There is only the limited pos-
sibility of issuing a suspension notice on the basis of an existing 
safety regulation or prohibition order. 
As far as penalties go, a distinction has to IJe drawn: breach 
of the general safety duty is merely an offence punishable by fine 
or imprisonment. There is no civil sanction. This is kept for the 
new product liability law30, as a conversion of the Community 
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Product Liability Directive. Contraventions of specific govem-
rnental regulatory rneasures, in particular safety regulations, re-
tain their traditional twofold character as crimes and as the torts 
of breach of statutory duty. 
2.5 Accident information systems 
The consurner protection policy debate in Britain takes on a 
special quality because the relevant legal policy work was set on 
an ernpirically based scientific foundation. During the rnid-
1970's, the UK began developing the rnost cornprehensive acci-
dent information systern of the tirnes alongside NEISS in the US, 
narnely the Horne Accident Surveillance System (HASS). In 
1977, following an initial stage in 1976, a system for collecting 
data on accidents at home and in the garden was developed in 
England and Wales. Twenty hospitals with 24-hour accident and 
ernergency services were incorporated into the systern as infor-
rnational sources. In an alternating pattem, ten hospitals at a time 
supply data on non-fatal accidents requiring rnedical treatrnent in 
hospital. Fatal accidents are surveyed and assessed by the Office 
of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS). According to the 
last available HASS report, frorn 1986 and based on 1985 fig-
ures31, every year in Great Britain, i.e. England, Scotland and 
Wales32, 5005 people die in horne accidents and 3.1 rnillion peo-
ple are seriously injured as to require rnedical treatrnent. Horne 
accidents constitute 40% of all fatal accidents in Great Britain (as 
against 42% road accident deaths), and at 34%, are by far the 
largest proportion of accident victirns treated in hospitals. The 
nurnber of fatal home accidents in the narrower HASS survey 
31 Horne Accidents, 1986. 
32 Figures for Scotland are supplied to HASS by the Scottish General 
Register Office. 
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area, England and Wales, has been very stable at around 4800 
since 1980. 
The hospital figures collected by HASS on non-fatal acci-
dents are systematically assessed and published every year. In 
particular, the annual report contains product-related data on ac-
cident frequency. AdditionaIJy, the Safety Research Section of 
the Department of Trade and Industry does in-depth studies, or 
has them done, to determine where there is need for political ac-
tion in the form of a safety regulation. 
The Community experimental model accident survey system 
of 1981 was largely inspired by this British example. lts present 
successor, the demonstration project of 22 April 1986, is however 
pattemed more closely on the Dutch model (PORS), under test 
since 1980. lt seems superior to HASS in three respects: (1) non-
restriction to house and garden, but inclusion of leisure and sport 
activities; (2) indusion of fatal accidents too; (3) diversification 
of infonnation sources to more than just hospital casualty ser-
vices. In Britain, HASS is at present being extended on the model 
of the Community demonstration project; specifically, a Horne 
Accident and Death Database (HADD) is being added, into 
which sport and leisure accidents are subsequently to be inte-
grated. The pilot stage began in November 1986 with one initial 
hospital. Inclusion of Scotland and Northem Ireland, i.e. the ex-
tension of the accident information systems (HASS/HADD) to 
Great Britain and to the United Kingdom as a whole, is still 
awaited. 
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2.6 Technical standardisation 
2.6.J The British Standards Institution 
Tue central institution for standardisation in Britain today is 
the British Standards Institution. Tue BSI is similar in history and 
structure to the DIN. lt began in 1901 as the Engineering Stan-
dards Committee, founded by engineering associations. Tue first 
technical standard was on rolled steel sections for rails. In 1918 it 
became the British Engineering Standards Association. A Royal 
Charter of 1928 gave it legal capacity. Tue present name was 
adopted in 1931. Tue tasks of the BSI, as formulated in Royal 
Charters of 1928, 1931 and 1981, consist primarily in developing 
technical standards and in certification of products. 
Today the BSI is headed by a board responsible for general 
standardisation policy. Below the board are six Councils over-
seeing specific areas: building, chemistry and health, engineering, 
electricity, technology and computing. There is also a Quality 
Assurance Council, responsible for product certification, tests 
and inspection. In 1984, the latter was transfonned into the Na-
tional Accreditation Council for certification bodies. Its tasks are 
to monitor and authorise for product certification and quality as-
sessment, certification bodies other than the BSI. Practical stan-
dardisation work is done by some 300 technical committees33. 
These committees are comprised of some 28,000 experts, pri-
marily from interested business circles who work on a voluntary 
basis. Tue BSI has more than 1074 permanent employees. 
Besides the technical committees, the Consumer Standards 
Advisory Committee is of importance from the viewpoint of 
product safety. Some 70-80 representatives of consumer associa-
tions take part in this endeavour. Tue Consumer Committee de-
33 The data refer to the BSI's Annual Report for 1985-6. 
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veloped out of the Women's Advisory Committee introduced in 
1951. Its task is to ensure involvement of consumer interests in 
the standardisation process. Tue Consumer Committee is at pre-
sent represented on 230 technical committees. Since consensus or 
unanimity by Committee members is a precondition for adoption 
of a technical standard by the BSI, opposition by a consurner rep-
resentative can block a standard. 
At present there are 10,124 British Standards. 8,900 Stan-
dards are being worked on (more than half of them international 
standards). Tue BSI budget currently amounts, according to the 
1985-6 Annual Report, to 26 million pounds. This sum is mainly 
derived from contributions of the 18,000 members, from the sale 
of standards specifications and from govemment contributions 
(4.5 million pounds). 
2.6.2 Methods of "reference to standards" 
British Standards, like DIN standards, are mere recommen-
dations. They have no legal standing34. This has au changed since 
the British Govemment adopted the "reference-to-standards" 
policy in worker and consumer protection law in the late 1970's. 
This policy is in turn determined by the great political value at-
taching to British Standards for the international competitivity of 
the British economy in the last decade, especially following UK 
entry into the EEC in 1973. Among political expressions of this 
situation are the (already cited) 1976 Green Paper "Consumer 
Safety", the General Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
to which Britain acceded in early 1980, the 1982 Memorandum 
of Understanding between Govemment and BSI, and particularly 
34 Every British Standard contains the following clause: "Compliance 
with a British Standard does not of itself confer immunity from legal 
obligation". 
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the 1982 White Paper "Standards, Quality and International 
Competitiveness". 
Ignoring for the moment the possibility of using British 
Standards for contractual description of performance, something 
done above all by the State when placing orders, there are four 
particular important ways for giving technical standards legal rel-
evance35: 
Incorporation. A formerly widespread method is to incorpo-
rate a British Standard, in modified form or sometimes ver· 
batim, into a safety regulation. An example of this is the Oil 
Heaters Regulations of 1961/1966. By contrast with refer-
ence proper, here it is the regulation itself - even though 
partly incorporating a British Standard - that indepen-
dently, and e:xhaustively, regulates the technical require-
ments. 
Strict reference. With this reference method, so far the ma-
jor one in Britain, the provision (as a rule a safety regula-
tion) refers for safety standard, test procedure, etc. directly 
to a British Standard, indicating the BS number and date. 
Compliance with this technical standard is then a legal obli-
gation. In German terminology, this is a case of rigid/static 
legal reference. Any change to the technical standard neces-
sitates adaptation of the safety regulation. Examples of this 
are the Heating Appliances (Fireguards) Regulations (1973) 
and the Nightdresses (Safety) Regulations 1967. 
Undated reference. In this case the safety regulation refers 
to one or more specific standards by simply mentioning the 
BS number, but compliance with the norm is not made 
binding. Tue manufacturer/importer then has alternative 
possibilities of meeting the safety requirements. This refer-
ence is made on a "deemed to satisfy" basis. 
General reference. The legal provisions may however also 
describe the safety requirements in general, or abstractly 
contain a general safety obligation36. Tue manufac-
35 Cf. also BS 0: A Standard for Standards, Part 1, 1981, Clause 9. 
36 E.g. Section 6 (!) (a) HSWA 1974, which, borrowing from § 3 (1) 
GSG, postulates a general duty "to ensure, so far as is reasonably prac-
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turer/importer/trader is free to choose the way he wishes to 
meet the requirements. One acceptable way will be to com-
ply with the relevant British Standard, or equivalent techni-
cal standards, if they exist. More recently, the Ministry has 
gone over to providing so-called administrative guidance. 
Here there is a clear statement of which technical norms 
satisfy the safety requirement concemed. This reference is 
made on the so-called "approved" basis. Practical examples 
are the Electrical Equipment (Safety) Regulations 1975, the 
Building Regulations and the area covered by the HSW A. 
By contrast with administrative provisions under § 11 of the 
German GSG, administrative guidance has no formal legal 
standing. 
This model ("approved" basis) ought also to be applicable 
now that a general safety duty has been statutorily introduced into 
consumer product law. Specific safety requirements will now be 
defined by "sound and modern practice" or "sound and modern 
standards of safety". What this in turn means would have tobe 
specified in approval schemes, which would no doubt be worked 
out under BSI direction with broad involvement of governmental 
and consumer representatives. Technical standards passing this 
test of certification or approval would then be puhlished in a list, 
comparable to that for administrative guidance. 
Though they have no legal significance, informal recom-
mendations of technical standards by local implementing agen-
cies continue to be of great importance in practice. 
Tue two methods of non-binding legal reference to technical 
standards ("undated and general reference") seem to be becoming 
steadily more common in Britain. In particular, the 1982 Gov-
emment White Paper "Standards, Quality and International Com-
petitiveness" is decidedly in favour of this regulatory approach 
("statute plus BSI"). Tue parallels with the "new approach" to 
ticable, that the article is so designed and constructed as to be safe and 
without risks to health when properly used". 
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harmonisation of technical standards at Community level are un-
mistakable. The introduction of a general safety duty in consumer 
product safety law, announced in the 1984 and 1985 White Pa-
pers and brought about through the Consumer Protection Act 
1987, is merely a consistent development of this legal area, with 
respect to both industrial and consumer protection policy. 
2 .6 .3 Product certifzcation 
Certification is an area that has been intensively discussed 
and dealt with in Britain, partly from a trade policy standpoint. In 
1982, certification procedure was available for between 200 and 
300 types of products. In the most part, BSI kitemarks are issued. 
Product certification is handled by the BSI through the Certifica-
tion and Assessment Department. In addition to this department, 
there are other recognised certification institutions in particular 
areas. Two examples are the British Electrotechnical Approvals 
Board (BEAB) for electrical products and the British Board of 
Agreement (BBA) in the area of building and construction. In 
Britain, three marks of conformity or quality are commonly used: 
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BS number. Mere use of the BS number is the least effective 
measure. lt is merely a statement by the user or manufac-
turer, not subject to any further control, that the product has 
been manufactured in accordance with the relevant British 
Standard. 
Kitemark. This conformity mark has existed since 1903. 
Authorisation to use the kitemark is given by the BSI fol-
lowing checking at the manufacturing plant to ensure that 
the requirements are met. At the end of 1986 there were 
1,365 kitemarks. The BSI Inspectorate carries out continual 
checks to ensure that the provisions are still being complied 
with. 
Safety mark. Since there are (as yet) no specific safety stan-
dards to date, and a British Standard is not necessarily ori-
ented towards coverage of all possible relevant safety re-
quirements, a safety mark was introduced in 1974. Firms 
may use it on products that have met special safety require-: 
ments when tested by the BSI. In practice, however, the' 
safety mark has evidently not yet caught up with the 
kitemarks. Compared with the 1,365 kitemarks at the end of 
1986, there were only 37 safety marks. · 
A fairly important procedure in Britain is that of quality as-
sessment. This centres not around an individual product, but 
rather on whether a manufacturing or service firm in general 
meets the requirements of BS 575037, the BSI's basic quality 
standard. Firms that meet the requirements - at present there are 
1,402 of them - are registered by the BSI. This registration also 
seems to be of interest to the firms concemed from a marketing · 
viewpoinL 
2. 7 Liability 
Traditionally in British safety law, the main non-adminis-
trative response to contraventions of safety regu1ations is criminal 
sanction38, Tue CSA Jays down penalties of up to three months 
imprisonment and fines of up to 1000 pounds (Section 2 (4)): 
However, the conditions under which the accused may put for-
ward the defence of due diligence are in each case regulated in 
detaiJ39. While the HSW A 197 4 explicitly excludes civil sanc-
tions, they are explicitly pennitted by the CPA 1961 and the CSA 
1978. Tue Consumer Protection Act 1987 once again provides 
37 BS 5750 has since been adopted internationally as ISO 9000. 
38 With the ~eneral political trend towards deregulation in Britain, too, 
the intenmnisterial study "Burdens on Business" (op. cit„ note 28), 62, 
has recently for the first time unreservedly recommended restriction to 
civil law and to insurance solutions. But even outside the narrower area 
of consumer product safety Jaw, increasing decriminalisation of eco-
nomic regulation is being called for. Cf. Tench, 1981; Breaking the 
Rules, 1980. 
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only criminal sanctions for breaches of the general safety re-
quirement (Section 10 (1) CPA). As to liability, in consumer 
product safety law in England and Wales there were three possi-
ble grounds of claim, of which however we shall describe only 
the first two in more detail, given their more direct relevance: 
breach of statutory duty, negligence ("product liability in tort") 
and contract. Henceforth the new product liability law embodies 
a third one (modified strict liability ). 
2.7.1 Breach of statutory duty 
The offence of breach of statutory duty is the most interest-
ing one from a liability point of view, even if to date, it has no 
practical importance40 with regards to consumer product safety 
law. This institution is controversial in the English legal literature 
on liability. Dias/Markesinis, for instance, say that it lies 
"between" liability on grounds of negligence and strict liability41. 
Firstly, Section 6 (1) CSA clearly states that breaches of obliga-
tions under safety regulations, prohibition orders or prohibition 
notices constitute a civil offence of breach of statutory duty. lt 
seems also to be undisputed that this is strict liability, since the 
criminal law defence of due diligence is ruled out. Liability is 
based on merely marketing an unsafe or damage-causing con-
sumer product. However clear this differentiation may seem, the 
demarcation becomes unclear when one comes to consider the 
cases of primary interest here, where the manufacturer/trader has 
complied with a technical standard referred to (in particular a 
39 Section 2 (6) CSA; Section 12 Consumer Safety (Amendment) Bill. 
40 According to information from the legal expert of the Department of 
Trade and Industry's Consumer Safety Unit, no action for compensa-
tion on the basis of breach of statutory duties can be traced. See also 
the DTI's document of November 1985, "Implementation of EC Direc-
tive on Product Liability", para. 42. 
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British Standard). No problems arise with the case where a safety 
regulation bindingly prescribes compliance with a particular 
standard (Section 1 (2) (b) CSA). Here, compliance with a tech-
nical standard that ultimately proves technically inadequate (for 
instance, because it is out of date) excludes breach of statutory 
duty as a ground of liability. More interesting, since it will no 
doubt be of greater importance in the future, is non-mandatory 
reference to technical standards, for instance, pursuant to Section 
1 (2) (c) CSA. 
For civil liability on grounds of breach of statutory duty, it 
must here suffice for the plaintiff to show that there has been a 
breach of the relevant safety regulation, in other words, an unsafe 
product has been brought to market. Since action for breach of 
statutory duty does not require negligence, the defence that a rel-
evant British Standard has been complied with is not admissible. 
Tue main defence open in breach of statutory duty cases is to 
show that the person suffering the damage is (largely) co-respon-
sible. Compensation for damage is limited to personal injuries. 
Exclusion of liability or limitation of liability is null and void42. 
Whether the courts will maintain this line of interpretation 
in the sense of "strict liability" in England and Wales is at present 
completely uncertain. Firstly, no relevant decisions have been 
taken as yet. Secondly, with the Consumer Protection Act 1987, 
British legislation has in part taken a different course. Breach of 
the general safety requirement now introduced has been specified 
solely as the elements of an offence. The liability aspect has been 
left for British product liability law, which has to implement the 
Community Product Liability Directive. By contrast with the Na-
tional Consumer Council's expectations expressed in 198443, the 
41 Dias/Markesinis, 1984, 156. Cf. also in general Stanton, 1986. 
42 Section 3 (lA) CSA, introduced by the Unfair Trade Act 1977. 
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offence of breach of statutory duty does not extend to the 
"general safety duty". Breach of statutory duty remains confined 
to the safety regulations and comparable governmental regulatory 
acts. Most recently, there has been a noticeable general trend by 
courts in England and Wales to look at the political objectives 
lying behind individual-case statutory regulations in order to 
specify the content and extent of the statutory duty and the cir-
cumstances that define its violation44. Since it has, however, be-
come clear since the 1980's that in the view of both Government 
and Parliament, "sound and modern standards of safety" ought to 
define the scope of the duty, it cannot be ruled out that if stan-
dards "approved" by the BSJ45 are observed, liability for breach 
of statutory duty will not arise. 
2.7.2 Negligence 
Liability under the common-law offence of negligence takes 
us outside the narrower context of consumer protection law. En-
titlement may here arise - subject to any special provisions of 
accident insurance or labour law - for anyone harmed by a 
product: a worker in a production process; a businessman in con-
nection with goods he uses in his trade; the final private con-
sumer. Liability for damage lies primarily with the manufacturer 
of a product, who also has to answer for negligence by his em-
ployees, on the principles of vicarious liability. 
Offence-based manufacturer liability on grounds of negli-
gence46 developed relatively late in English common law. 
Whereas in the US and Germany the foundations had been laid 
43 The Safety of Goods (loc. cit„ note 23), 7-10. 
44 Dias/Markesinis, 1984, 158. 
45 Cf. 2.6.2 supra. 
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by similar decisions at the highest judicial level at around the 
same time, 1915-1647, this did not come about in England until 
1932. Tue landmark decision In Re M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. 
Stevenson4& for the first time assumed positive duties of care 
between persons outside contractual relationships, which could 
be breached merely by being negligent ("not using reasonable 
care"). Subsequently, negligence liability by manufacturers of de-
fective products was consolidated. Tue general duty of care was 
differentiated into manufacturing duties ("production defects"), 
design duties ("design defects") and duties of instruction 
("marketing defects"). Procedurally as weil, it may now be taken 
as a basis in England and Wales - comparable in this respect 
with the FRG - that it is in principle sufficient for the injured 
party to show that interests protected under the law of tort have 
been injured during proper use of the product in question. By the 
res ipsa loquitur rule, the manufacturer's negligence is (refutably) 
presumed. 
As regards the law of evidence, it is in principle to be taken 
as a basis in English law, that conformity with a standard or de-
parture from one, is not synonymous with conduct in accordance 
with, or contrary to, one's duty. Non-compliance with a British 
Standard engenders a strong presumption of negligence. Obser-
vance of relevant technical standards to which non-binding refer-
ence has been made, places the onus on the plaintiff to provide 
positive proof of the manufacturer's negligence. In cases of strict 
reference, compliance with the technical Standard concemed 
should suffice to rule out negligence. 
46 Cf. esp. Hepple/Mat!hews, 1985, 258 et seq. 
47 RGZ 87, 1 - Brunnensalz (1915); Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 N.Y. 382, 111N.E.1050 (1916). 
48 A. C. 562 (1932). 
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At least since Walton v. British Leyland UK Ltd. (1978), a 
duty to monitor a product and respond accordingly seems to have 
been recognised. This is the counterpart in law of tort to the reg-
ulatory "notice to warn". In Walton v. British Leyland, the car 
manufacturer was condemned to make compensation for dam-
ages, on grounds of breach of a duty of recall. English law has 
also developed duties of care and transaction under law of tort for 
the marketing stages. Tue doctrine of "strict liability", adopted by 
most US States since 196349, has not yet been accepted by En-
glish law of tort any more than by German producer liability law. 
2.7.3 The present legal policy situation ( 1987) 
Tue forthcoming implementation of the Community Product 
Liability Directive in British law and the British Govemment's 
undertaking in 1987 to introduce a general safety duty into con-
sumer protection law, broke the ground for innovative develop-
ments. These included: (1) Introduction of a general safety duty 
into the Consumer Safety Act; raising criminal penalties; removal 
of the offence of breach of statutory duty from the CSA, with re-
vised provision for it in a special act on product liability; (2) In-
troduction of a general safety duty into the CSA, with retention of 
possibly raised criminal and civil sanctions; implementation of 
the Community Directive in a separate product liability act. 
Tue Consumer Protection Act 1987 largely implemented the 
second option. Accordingly, British product liability law will, as 
far as consumer goods are concemed, be based on three princi-
ples: 
49 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc„ 59 Ca!. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897. 
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Modified strict liability under the Product Liability Act 
(implementing the Community Directive); 
Breach of statutory duty in so far as safety regulations or 
comparable measures have laid down specific duties as to 
conduct; 
General liability in common law, specifically under law of 
tort (negligence ). 
Infringement of the newly introduced general safety re-
quirement remains irrelevant for purposes of civil law. Only 
criminal sanctions are provided. 
2.8 Information 
As regards information on product hazards, two addressees 
should in principle be distinguished: (1) the regulatory authority 
and (2) potential purchasers of the unsafe product. 
2.8.1 lnformation of regulatory bodies 
As regards information to govemmental agencies on dam-
age-causing products, the 1976 Green Paper referred to the fol-
lowing sources50: 
Govemment departments; 
Complaints about product defects from Members of Parlia-
ment and the public; 
Local authorities; 
Consumer associations and the Royal Society for the Pre-
vention of Accidents; 
50 Cmnd. 6398, 1976, 2. 
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Tue national and international press and specialised jour-
nals; 
Tue BSI; 
Tue Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS). 
Most important by far is the HASS/HADD accident infor-
mation system which has been extremely effective in reporting 
on non-fatal accidents in England and Wales. HASS and HADD 
are described above (2.5). 
2.8.2 Information to purchasers of products 
Purchaser information outside the market traditionally plays 
a major role in Britain. Three elements in particular should be 
stressed: comparative testing of goods, conformity marks and 
consumer education. 
As in other countries reported on, comparative tests of 
goods have long been customary in Britain, too. A prominent role 
in this connection is played by the Consumer Association Ltd. 
This is a private-law non-profit-making organisation founded in 
1957, financed exclusively from membership dues. Membership 
at present comprises some 700,000 persons. Tue Consumer As-
sociation carries out comparative tests on all types of consumer 
goods and relevant services. Test results are published in the 
magazine "Which?", directly available only to members. Since, 
however, test results are reported on television and in the press 
and the magazine is available in public libraries, the Consumer 
Association and "Which?"51 have an overall importance for con-
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sumer education equalling that of the German Stiftung Warentest 
and its magazine "test". 
In addition to general "brand names" (including various 
types of marks used by various firms or businesses), conformity 
marks or trade marks serve as conveyors of information to pur-
chasers. Certification trade marks, above all the BSI kitemarks, 
are regulated in general in the Trade Marks Act 1938 (Section 
37). Authorised use of the confonnity mark testifies to compli-
ance with particular quality or safety requirements. 
One peculiar feature of the British situation is the impor-
tance attached to consumer protection, here primarily in connec-
tion with safety in the home, through consumer education, in the 
schools. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents 
(ROSPA), publicly funded, has set itself the task of bringing 
safety questions into school syllabuses. The govemment's Press 
and Information Office supplies schools with füm material for 
this purpose and television stations broadcast corresponding 
"safety messages" in pauses between programmes. 
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